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Non-technical summary 
In the last decade, the domestic U.S. airline industry has experienced a substantial 
consolidation trend. In addition to a number of high level mergers such as American Airlines 
– Trans World Airlines (2001), America West – US Airways (2005) and Delta Air Lines – 
Northwest Airlines (2009), several smaller carriers such as National Airlines (2002), 
Independence Air (2006) and ATA Airlines (2008) had to leave the industry. 
Despite this high relevance of firm exits for the recent development of the domestic U.S. 
airline industry, empirical evidence on the effects of these consolidations is rare. Studies 
focusing on the market impact of liquidations do not exist to the best of our knowledge and 
the existing studies on the competitive effects of airline mergers almost exclusively stem from 
the 1980s and focus on the specific case of a largely overlapping route network of the 
merging parties (due to a shared hub). However, such a network structure is rather uncommon 
in recent mergers and therefore raises the demand for both a new conceptual framework for 
investigating firm exits in the airline industry and a corresponding new empirical analysis of 
the effects of such firm exits. 
Against this background, we study the competitive effects of five liquidations and six mergers 
in the domestic U.S. airline industry between 1995 and 2010. Applying fixed effects 
regression models we find that route exits due to liquidation lead to substantially larger and 
permanent price increases (of about 12 percent) than merger-related exits. Within the merger 
category, our analysis reveals that prices on overlapping routes increase by about 6 percent in 
the short run, whereas a simple merger-induced switch of the operating carrier causes a 
significant price increase of about 3 percent. Accordingly, we observe large reductions in 
quantity for route exits caused by firm liquidations and moderate reductions in case of 
merger-related exits. Entry-inducing effects of firm exits are found particularly for 
liquidations and smaller mergers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Im Laufe des vergangenen Jahrzehnts war in der US-amerikanischen Luftverkehrsindustrie 
ein substanzieller Konsolidierungstrend zu beobachten. Neben einigen größeren Fusionen wie 
beispielsweise American Airlines – Trans World Airlines (2001), America West – US 
Airways (2005) und Delta Air Lines – Northwest Airlines (2009) gingen einige kleinere 
Fluggesellschaften wie National Airlines (2002), Independence Air (2006) und ATA Airlines 
(2008) in Konkurs und verließen die Industrie.  
Trotz dieser festgestellten hohen Relevanz von Firmenaustritten für die jüngeren 
Entwicklungen der US-amerikanischen Luftverkehrsindustrie sind empirische 
Untersuchungen zu den ökonomischen Effekten dieser Konsolidierungen sehr spärlich gesät. 
Während Studien mit einem Fokus auf konkursbedingte Firmenaustritte nach unserem 
Kenntnisstand gar nicht existieren, konzentrierten sich fast alle existierenden Studien zu den 
wettbewerblichen Effekten von Fusionen zwischen Fluggesellschaften auf Fälle aus den 
1980er Jahren. Diese Fusionen waren allerdings gekennzeichnet von einem stark 
überlappenden Luftverkehrsnetz der fusionieren Parteien (bedingt durch einen gemeinsamen 
Hub-Flughafen); ein Merkmal, das aktuellere Fusionen nicht aufweisen. Es liegt daher nahe, 
nicht nur ein neues konzeptionelles Grundgerüst für eine Analyse der wettbewerblichen 
Effekte solcher Firmenaustritte zu entwickeln, sondern dieses in der Folge mit einer 
empirischen Analyse von konkurs- und fusionsbedingten Firmenaustritten zu kombinieren. 
Vor diesem Hintergrund untersuchen wir die wettbewerblichen Effekte von fünf Konkursen 
und sechs Fusionen im US-amerikanischen Luftverkehr zwischen 1995 und 2010. Im Zuge 
der Anwendung verschiedener Paneldatenmodelle mit fixen Effekten stellen wir fest, dass 
konkursbedingte Marktaustritte zu substanziell höheren und permanenten Preisanstiegen (von 
durchschnittlich 12 Prozent) führen als fusionsbedingte Austritte. Innerhalb der Kategorie der 
fusionsbedingten Marktaustritte zeigt unsere empirische Analyse, dass auf überlappenden 
Streckenmärkten die Preise durchschnittlich um 6 Prozent in der kurzen Frist ansteigen, 
während für Routen, auf denen nur ein fusionsbedingter Wechsel der Fluggesellschaft 
stattfindet, Preisanstiege von durchschnittlich 3 Prozent zu beobachten sind. Im Einklang mit 
diesen Ergebnissen finden wir eine große Reduktion der angebotenen Kapazitäten im Falle 
von Konkursen und einen eher moderaten Rückgang im Falle von Fusionen. Verstärkter 
Markteintritt nach den entsprechenden Firmenaustritten kann insbesondere bei Konkursen 
und Fusionen von kleineren Fluggesellschaften festgestellt werden. 
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Abstract  
We study the competitive effects of five liquidations and six mergers in the domestic U.S. 
airline industry between 1995 and 2010. Applying fixed effects regression models we find 
that route exits due to liquidation lead to substantially larger price increases than merger-
related exits. Within the merger category, our analysis reveals significant price increases on 
all affected routes immediately after the exit events. In the medium and long-run, however, 
realized merger efficiencies and entry-inducing effects are found to be strong enough to drive 
prices down to pre-exit levels.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The benefits of competition and innovation are largely ensured by both market entry and 
market exit. Market entry plays a key role as an equilibrium force – which competes away 
excess profits to an equilibrium level – and as a disequilibrium force – which propels the 
industry from one equilibrium state to another due to the introduction and diffusion of 
innovations (see Geroski, 1991, 1995). Market exit is considered a key instrument to sanction 
unprofitable product and service ideas thereby renewing the industry population through a 
process of ‘creative destruction’ (Schumpeter, 1942). Only the close interaction of market 
entry of innovative and/or more efficient new firms and the corresponding decline and market 
exit of less innovative and/or less efficient incumbent firms through either merger or 
liquidation can guarantee dynamically efficient markets. 
 The U.S. airline industry has experienced many firm entries and exits since its deregulation 
in 1978. For example, following a transition period in the years after deregulation with a 
moderate number of in sum 13 firm entries and 6 firm exits, the substantial growth period 
from 1982 to 1984 witnessed the entry of 31 new interstate airlines – excluding regional 
carriers – compared to only 15 exits either through merger or liquidation. However, the 
subsequent shake-out period from 1985 to 1987 showed roughly inverted characteristics with 
only 16 additional entries compared to 38 exits (mostly through liquidation).1  
 Although the number of mergers and liquidations in the last two decades has been 
substantially lower than in the first shake-out phase of the liberalized U.S. airline industry, 
both types of firm exit continue to have a substantial impact on the industry. This is 
particularly true for large mergers such as American Airlines – Trans World Airlines (2001), 
America West – US Airways (2005) and Delta Air Lines – Northwest Airlines (2009) but also 
for larger liquidations such as National Airlines (2002), Independence Air (2006) and ATA 
Airlines (2008).  
 Despite this continuing relevance of firm exits in the U.S. airline industry, recent empirical 
evidence is rare. Empirical studies on the effects of liquidations do not exist to the best of our 
knowledge and the existing studies on the competitive effects of airline mergers almost 
exclusively stem from the 1980s and focus on the specific case of a largely overlapping route 
                                                 
1  The data stems from Borenstein and Rose (2008). Interestingly, the authors report that out of the group of 44 
(interstate) carriers that entered the U.S. airline industry between 1979 and 1984, only 7 operated in 1990 and 
only two remain in operation today (Southwest Airlines and America West (using the US Airways brand)). 
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network of the merging parties (due to a shared hub). However, such a network structure is 
rather uncommon in recent mergers and therefore raises the demand for both a new 
conceptual framework for investigating firm exits in the airline industry and a corresponding 
new empirical analysis of the effects of such exits.   
 Against this background, we study the competitive effects of five liquidations and six 
mergers in the domestic U.S. airline industry between 1995 and 2010. Applying fixed effects 
regression models we find that route exits due to liquidation lead to substantially larger and 
permanent price increases (of about 12 percent) than merger-related exits. Within the merger 
category, our analysis reveals that prices on overlapping routes increase by about 6 percent in 
the short run, whereas a simple merger-induced switch of the operating carrier causes a 
significant price increase of about 3 percent. Accordingly, we observe large reductions in 
quantity for route exits caused by firm liquidations and moderate reductions in case of 
merger-related exits. Entry-inducing effects of firm exits are found particularly for 
liquidations and smaller mergers. Our findings have important implications for unilateral 
effects analysis as part of horizontal merger assessments. 
 The paper is structured as follows. The following second section provides a conceptual 
framework for the analysis of the competitive effects of firm exit in the airline industry, 
followed by the discussion of descriptive evidence for the U.S. airline industry in the third 
section. The fourth section presents our empirical analysis and provides a discussion of the 
results and their policy implications. The fifth section concludes the paper with a summary of 
the key results.  
2 THE COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF FIRM EXIT IN THE AIRLINE 
INDUSTRY – A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Market exit can be assessed on two different aggregation levels: exit of entire companies due 
to either liquidation or merger (so-called firm exits) and single market exit decisions of still 
operating companies for strategic reasons such as lack of profitability2 or – in case of the 
airline industry - network reorganization (so-called operational exits). Firm exits differ from 
operational exits by the fact that the former typically cause multiple market exits at one 
particular point in time. Furthermore, while operational exists can typically be reversed if, 
                                                 
2  Several reasons for an unprofitable route presence are conceivable: incumbent(s) reaction(s) to entry, 
wrongly estimated demand (O&D and/or connecting traffic), insufficient growth potential, increases in 
passenger facility or airport charges, macroeconomic demand shocks, input cost increases etc.  
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e.g., market conditions change, firm exits are ultimate thereby reducing (actual and potential) 
competition on a permanent basis.  
 The economic effects of the two distinctive forms of market exit can be analyzed from at 
least two perspectives: ‘general economic effects’ and ‘competitive effects’. The former 
category investigates the consequences of market exit on general economic factors such as 
employment or (regional) economic growth. Any study of these general economic effects 
must look beyond the level of the respective firm and its product markets and has to include 
important knock-on effects of market exit on, e.g., the airport, other aviation-related service 
industries or spillovers to the general economic growth in the respective region. For example, 
if an airline decides to leave a certain hub airport, either due to liquidation (i.e., firm exit) or 
to network reorganization (i.e., operational exit), it is very likely that the respective airport 
and other aviation-related service industries will lose business. Furthermore, the entire region 
might face a reduction in attractiveness due to the lower quality of airline connections. 
 Complementary to an analysis of the effects of exit on the general economic level, an 
assessment of the competitive effects of exit is a compulsory part of an entire analysis of the 
economic consequences of exit. Generally, such an assessment investigates the effects of 
market exit on competition in these markets. Particularly interesting objects of investigation 
are the effects on average prices, demand, capacity and quality. For example, if before exit, 
two airlines were competing fiercely in a certain non-stop market and one of the competitors 
finally has to exit the market due to liquidation, it becomes likely that the remaining carrier 
will use this opportunity to increase price. However, in the medium and long run, market 
entry by other (more efficient) airlines might become attractive, i.e., firm exit might create so-
called entry-inducing effects (see Werden and Froeb (1998) for a seminal paper3) suggesting 
that prices might increase immediately after exit but exhibit a downward trend in the medium 
and longer run. As a consequence, a study on the competitive effects of exit should not be 
constrained to an analysis of the short-term effects on price but has to extend its perspective to 
both a larger observation window and the inclusion and interpretation of further competition 
variables such as passengers and departures.  
                                                 
3  Werden and Froeb (1998) investigate the role of entry-inducing effects in antitrust policy. Based on mergers 
in simple Cournot and Bertrand industries, they find that firms only have an incentive to merge if (a) they 
expect significant efficiencies generated from the merger, or (b) they are aware of substantial entry barriers 
which allow them to charge supracompetitive profits post-merger. They conclude that antitrust authorities 
should be rather skeptical with respect to the power of entry to prevent (or reverse) anticompetitive effects of 
horizontal mergers. 
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 In the remainder of this paper, we concentrate on the competitive effects of firm exit. The 
firm exit category is subdivided further into multiple market exits due to liquidation and 
multiple market exits due to merger. In our empirical investigation, we include ‘operational 
exits’ as third category in order to allow for a direct comparison between the effects of firm 
exits and single market exits. For a detailed discussion on the competitive effects of firm exit, 
we draw on a simple airline network with two separate airlines 1 and 2 operating hubs H1 and 
H2, respectively (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: A simple network with two airlines 
Source: own figure 
 
The two hubs are connected by services of both carriers (route H1H2) while the respective 
spokes are only served by the respective hub airline, i.e., routes AH1, BH1 and CH1 by airline 
1 and H2D, H2E and H2F by airline 2. In the following sub-sections, we discuss the 
competitive effects of a liquidation, i.e., airline 1 disappears from the market, and the 
competitive effects of a merger, i.e., airline 2 acquires airline 1 and continues operating the 
entire network. 
2.1 FIRM EXIT THROUGH LIQUIDATION  
The bankruptcy laws in many countries allow two different forms of bankruptcy: the attempt 
of reorganization (and a potential ‘emergence’ from bankruptcy) or a process of liquidation 
(which typically leads to the exit of the respective firm). As the focus in this paper is on the 
effects of firm exit, we concentrate on those bankruptcies which lead to the ultimate market 
exit (i.e., liquidation) of the respective firm. 
 When studying the competitive effects of liquidation exits on prices and quantity, basic 
oligopoly theory allows the derivation of several key relationships. In the short run, at least 
two separate arguments speak for significant price increases. First, the substantial reduction in 
capacity due to exit of one competitor is expected to cause substantial price increases and 
corresponding reductions in quantities. Second, pre-exit competition on the respective routes 
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might have been fierce (as at least one carrier was fighting for life) suggesting price increases 
‘up to the usual competitive level’ post-exit.4 Referring to the simple airline network defined 
above, the described competitive effects are expected on all routes operated by airline 1. If no 
other competitors are operating on the respective spoke routes AH1, BH1 and CH1, (non-stop) 
services are terminated completely. 
 In the medium and long run, however, the anticipated effects on the key variables are less 
clear. On the one hand, existing carriers might find it profitable to expand capacity in the 
respective markets, thereby putting pressure on price. On the other hand, other airlines might 
have incentives to enter the respective routes (the hub-to-hub as well as the spoke routes) 
thereby increasing competition and triggering a downward trend in price. However, the 
respective possibilities of entry depend on both profit expectations on the one hand and the 
size of (structural and/or strategic) barriers to entry on the other hand leaving the direction and 
size of the medium- and long run effects of firm exit through liquidation unclear. For 
example, large scale entry into H1 might not be too attractive given the fact that another 
airline just exited the respective airport. Furthermore, entry into H2 might be difficult 
(technically and economically) as soon as airline 2 has a dominant position at this hub.  
2.2 FIRM EXIT THROUGH MERGER  
Mergers and acquisitions (‘mergers’ in the following) are another form of firm exit. In order 
to derive hypotheses on the effects of mergers on competition, we have to introduce a 
separation of possibly affected routes. So-called overlapping routes are characterized by the 
presence of both merging carriers before the merger, i.e., they are direct competitors in the 
respective non-stop markets (route H1H2 in Figure 15). In contrast, we introduce a second 
category of routes for which possible merger effects cannot be ruled out: the so-called 
switching routes. Switching routes are operated by the junior merger partner ex-ante but are 
taken over by the lead merger partner as a consequence of the merger (routes AH1, BH1 and 
CH1 in Figure 1 if airline 2 acquires airline 1).6  
                                                 
4  From this perspective, liquidation has the potential to realize ‘liquidation efficiencies’ in the sense that the 
market exit of one carrier allows the other carriers to earn a reasonable return on investment and to continue 
serving the respective market. 
5  Although Figure 1 only shows one overlapping route (H1H2), overlaps in real airline networks are not 
restricted to hub-to-hub operations but can also be observed in other constellations such as route CH2 or route 
AD. Our empirical analysis below includes all different types of overlapping routes.  
6  In general, a key determinant of the possibilities to increase price post-merger are the network structures pre-
merger. If the networks are largely complementary as assumed in the simple network structure in Figure 1, 
theory and empirical evidence suggest that anticompetitive effects are only likely on the (few) routes on 
which both merging parties are operating before the merger. However, if the degree of route overlap is 
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 Focusing on overlapping routes first, in the short run, the capacity of the junior carrier is 
unlikely to be removed entirely from the market. However, mergers might lead to an increase 
in market power thereby incentivizing the merged entity to reduce quantity and increase price. 
Ceteris paribus, price increases immediately after the merger should be less pronounced than 
price increases after liquidation exits. In the medium and long run, the notional effects are 
again less clear. On the one hand, capacity expansions of existing competitors or entry by 
potential competitors might constrain the market power of the merged parties. On the other 
hand, barriers to entry such as hub dominance might reduce the threat of entry substantially 
thereby allowing the merged parties to permanently increase prices. Comparing liquidation-
related exits and merger-related exits, it can be expected that capacity increases through entry 
are more likely after liquidations given the substantial loss of capacity due to the exit of one 
carrier. Merger-related exists, however, are more likely to put the merging parties in a 
stronger position on the respective overlapping routes suggesting a dissuading effect on the 
entry incentives of potential competitors. 
 Turning from overlapping routes to switching routes, an initial assessment of this route 
type might suggest that competitive effects are rather unlikely, especially because the number 
of competitors on these routes is unaffected by the merger. However, a closer look reveals 
that the merger-induced change in the operator might contain several possibilities for price 
reactions. First, a change in ownership might cause changes in pricing and other strategic 
variables possibly triggering significant price changes post-merger. Second, the merger might 
have an impact on the quality of the merged product. For example, the merger of two 
complementary networks creates additional travel possibilities for the customers of both 
airlines thereby increasing quality (and possibly justifying price increases). Last but not least, 
the merger increases multimarket contact among the remaining airlines in the industry and 
might therefore ease the realization of (tacitly) collusive outcomes.  
 Although horizontal mergers unavoidably raise market concentration, a countervailing 
force to market power-induced price increases are possible merger efficiencies (see 
Williamson (1968) for a seminal paper). Such efficiencies might come in the form of both 
savings in marginal costs and fixed costs and are likely to be realized in the medium and long 
run. Merger efficiencies might create incentives to pass on a significant share down to the 
consumers through price reductions post-merger. Again, it is difficult ex-ante to derive clear 
                                                                                                                                                        
substantial, e.g., due to hub operations of both airlines at the same airport, anticompetitive effects on a large 
number of non-stop connections are much more likely. 
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hypotheses in this respect. In general, efficiencies can partly become effective within the 
entire merged airline network (e.g., through a cheaper sourcing of input goods for the merged 
entity) and might partly be attributed to certain improvements of particular hub presences etc. 
In other words, efficiencies can play a role in both overlapping and switching routes. A key 
problem in an assessment of merger efficiencies is the unknown time-frame of their 
realization. While marginal cost savings might be realized relatively quickly after the merger, 
fixed costs savings might take substantially longer (and are therefore difficult to isolate 
empirically from other effects that might influence the price and cost levels of the respective 
airline). 
3 FIRM EXIT IN THE U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY 
Based on the general discussion of firm exit in the preceding section, this section investigates 
the issue specifically for the U.S. airline industry. Differentiating between firm exits and 
operational exits, Figure 2 shows the number of exits in non-stop domestic U.S. airline 
markets between the third quarter of 1995 and the first quarter of 2010. 
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Figure 2: Exits from non-stop domestic U.S. airline markets 
(3rd quarter 1995 – 1st quarter 2010)7 
Source: DOT T-100 Segment Data, authors’ calculations. 
 The quarter of exit is defined as the first quarter after an airline provided the last non-stop 
service between two airports. In sum, the observation period shows that operational exits 
fluctuate substantially between the years with peaks after the 9/11 attacks and the beginning 
                                                 
7  The graph shows the (aggregated) exit activities of the following 27 major U.S. carriers: AA, AS, B6, BF, 
CO, DH, DL, F9, FF, FL, G4, HA, HP, J7, N7, NJ, NK, NW, QQ, SY, TW, TZ, UA, US, VX, WN, YX (1).  
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of the economic crisis in 2008. The figure further reveals that six larger mergers and five8 
larger liquidations took place between 1999 and 2010. The by far largest number of route 
exits due to firm exit was triggered by the Delta Air Lines – Northwest Airlines merger which 
materialized in the first quarter of 2010. The by far largest liquidation case was Independence 
Air in the first quarter of 2006. In general, most liquidations and mergers create significant 
‘shocks’ in the exit statistics in the respective quarters. The following sections will take a 
closer look at firm exits through liquidation and merger in the U.S. airline industry between 
1995 and 2010. 
3.1 FIRM EXIT THROUGH LIQUIDATION  
In the United States, Chapter 7 of the Title 11 of the Bankruptcy Code governs the process of 
liquidation while Chapters 11 and 13 govern the process of reorganization of a debtor in 
bankruptcy. While Chapter 7 is the usual form of bankruptcy in the United States, most airline 
bankruptcies refer to Chapter 11. However, although most airlines successfully went through 
the process of reorganization and exited Chapter 11 at some point, several carriers eventually 
were liquidated. In fact, most liquidations of U.S. carriers were carried out under Chapter 11 
and not under Chapter 7. For the period from 1995 to 2010, we identified five liquidations of 
larger U.S. airlines (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Liquidations of larger U.S. airlines between 1995 and 2010 
Airline IATA Code 
Year of 
firm 
entry 
Quarter 
of firm 
exit 
Number of domestic 
non-stop routes 
operated (quarter 
before/of firm exit) 
Number of domestic 
passengers 
transported (quarter 
before/of firm exit) 
Share of domestic 
passengers 
transported (quarter 
before/of firm exit) 
ATA Airlines TZ 1986 2008-2 15 372,412 2.35‰ 
Independence Air DH 2004 2006-1 44 1,013,483 6.47‰ 
Vanguard Airlines NJ 1994 2002-4 17 199,747 1.42‰ 
National Airlines N7 1999 2002-4 10 612,514 4.35‰ 
Tower Air FF 1983 2000-2 6 121,850 0.87‰ 
Sources: Airlines for America (http://www.airlines.org/Pages/U.S.-Airline-Bankruptcies-and-Service-Cessations.aspx), U.S. 
DOT, T-100 Domestic Segment Data, authors’ calculations.  
 
As shown in Table 1, all liquidation cases were relatively small, reflected in measures such as 
the number of non-stop routes operated in the quarter before exit or the share of passengers 
transported compared to the number of passengers in the entire domestic U.S airline industry. 
However, despite the small size of all liquidation cases compared to the entire national 
market, it would be superficial to automatically conclude the irrelevance of an economic 
analysis. As all exiting airlines had a particular geographic focus, the impact on this particular 
                                                 
8  National Airlines and Vanguard Airlines were liquidated in the same quarter (2002-4). 
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set of routes in this particular region can be quite substantial and therefore justifies a detailed 
investigation. 
 Existing empirical research on the competitive effects of U.S. airline bankruptcies 
concentrates solely on cases in which the respective airlines were not liquidated but entered a 
temporary phase of reorganization. In a seminal paper, Borenstein and Rose (1995) 
investigate the effects of bankruptcy filings by seven U.S carriers on market conduct. They 
find that carriers lowered fares by 5 to 6 percent before entering bankruptcy, however, 
refrained from further fare cuts after entering bankruptcy protection. Furthermore, the study 
reveals that the fare reductions are only observable in the short term and are not followed by 
route-level competitors. Ciliberto and Schenone (2008) not only confirm this last result, but 
especially find that the observed changes in prices must be generated by a reduction in 
capacity by the bankrupt firms and not by other explanations such as cost reductions or 
changes in strategic behavior. In a sense, these results conflict with earlier findings by Busse 
(2002). She uses data on 14 major airlines between 1985 and 1992 and concludes that firms in 
worse financial condition are more likely to start price wars. Last but not least, Borenstein and 
Rose (2003) specifically investigate the impact of bankruptcy on airline service levels and 
find that bankruptcies reduce service levels (as measured in the ‘number of nonstop flights’ 
and the ‘number of destinations served on a non-stop basis’) at some airports. The estimated 
effect is found to be the greatest for midsize airports (i.e., airports between 100 and 400 
flights per day).  
 Although the studies on the competitive effects of bankruptcy reorganization come to 
interesting and policy-relevant conclusions, economic theory suggests that the competitive 
effects of airline liquidations are different. As argued above, liquidation causes multiple route 
exits at one particular point in time which cannot be reversed thereby reducing (actual and 
potential) competition on a permanent basis. Given the absence of studies which empirically 
investigate the direction and size of the competitive effects of firm liquidations, we provide 
such an analysis in the fourth section below. 
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3.2 FIRM EXIT THROUGH MERGER  
In the history of the U.S. airline industry, both types of firm exit, liquidations and mergers, 
have often been interpreted as closely interrelated in the sense that (especially large) bankrupt 
airlines were acquired by a competitor to basically avoid liquidation. 
Table 2: Mergers and acquisitions of larger U.S. airlines between 1995 and 2010 
Merging parties Closed Quarter 
of 
merger 
exits 
Resulting 
carrier 
Number of 
junior partner’s 
domestic non-
stop route exits 
due to merger 
Junior partner’s 
domestic 
passengers 
(quarter before/of 
merger) 
Share of junior 
partner’s domestic 
passengers 
(quarter before/of 
merger) 
Delta Air Lines / 
Northwest Airlines 12/31/2009 2010-1 
Delta  
Air Lines 148 7,220,155 4.770% 
Frontier Airlines / 
Midwest Airlines 7/31/2009 2009-4 
Frontier 
Airlines 11 529,666 0.321% 
US Airways /  
America West Airlines 9/27/2005 2005-4 
US  
Airways 91 6,859,074 4.059% 
American Airlines / 
TWA 4/9/2001 2001-3 
American 
Airlines 85 6,152,064 3.924% 
American Airlines / 
Reno Air 2/1/1999 1999-2 
American 
Airlines 24 1,247,481 0.928% 
AirTran Airways / 
Valujet 11/17/1997 1998-1 
AirTran 
Airways 27 718,592 0.535% 
Sources: Airlines for America (http://www.airlines.org/Pages/U.S.-Airline-Mergers-and-Acquisitions.aspx), U.S. DOT, T-100 
Domestic Segment Data, authors’ calculations. 
 
 As shown in Table 2, the observation period has experienced six mergers between larger 
U.S. airlines, including (at least) three ‘failing firms’ (Trans World Airlines, US Airways, and 
Valujet). As reflected in the correspondingly high numbers of non-stop route exits due to the 
merger or the share of passengers in the quarter before the merger (relative to all domestic 
U.S. airline passengers), three mergers have been particularly large transactions – American 
Airlines – Trans World Airlines (2001), America West – US Airways (2005) and Delta Air 
Lines – Northwest Airlines (2010) – while the remaining three transactions were of 
significantly smaller size. However, as already argued for the liquidation cases above, it 
would be superficial to automatically ignore these smaller transactions, e.g., due to possibly 
substantial effects on the affected routes.  
 Existing empirical research on the competitive effects of U.S. airline mergers largely refers 
to the late 1980s.9 On the one hand, this period was characterized by a substantial industry 
                                                 
9  An incomplete list of empirical articles focusing on the competitive effects of U.S. airline mergers includes 
Beutel and McBride (1992), Borenstein (1990), Brueckner et al. (1992), Butler and Huston (1989), Jordan 
(1988), Kim and Singal (1993), Morrison (1996) and Werden et al. (1991). Furthermore, an event study 
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consolidation leading to a large number of mergers as possible study objects. On the other 
hand, the Department of Justice followed a laissez-faire approach to antitrust policy at that 
time – strongly influenced by the theory of contestable markets by Baumol et al. (1982) – and 
leading to the approval of basically all merger proposals independent of their potential for 
anticompetitive effects.  
 Two U.S. airline mergers – both completed in 1986 – experienced a particularly detailed 
ex-post investigation of their competitive effects: Northwest Airlines – Republic Airlines 
(NW-RC) and Trans World Airlines – Ozark Airlines (TW-OZ). Both mergers involved a 
shared major hub airport and therefore led to substantial increases in market power post-
merger. In a first influential paper, Werden et al. (1991) investigate the price and output 
effects of the two mergers at their respective hub airports and find yield increases of about 
5.6 percent and service decreases of about 23.7 percent for the NW-RC merger. Yield 
increases (1.5 percent) and service decreases (16.2 percent) were somewhat smaller for the 
TW-OZ merger. Borenstein (1990) analyzes the effects of the same two mergers at their hub 
airports and finds evidence for price increases for the NW-RC merger of about 9.5 percent in 
total (with about 6.7 percent price increases if other airlines remain as route competitors and 
about 22.5 percent if the merger led to a monopoly route). For the TW-OZ merger, however, 
his analysis resulted in largely insignificant results with the exception of a significant price 
decrease of about 12.3 percent on monopoly routes which were operated by TW or NZ before 
the merger.10 Interestingly, Borenstein’s analysis therefore showed that the mergers had an 
impact “not just on routes that both airlines had served prior to the merger, but also on routes 
where only one of the two merger partners competed with another airline or operated without 
active competition” (Borenstein (1990), p. 404). He explains this finding by the possibilities 
to reduce the threat of potential competition due to increased airport dominance.  
 Borenstein’s key result of merger effects on routes in which only one of the merging 
carriers was active pre-merger is confirmed in studies by Kwoka and Shumilkina (2010) and 
Kim and Singal (1993). While Kwoka and Shumilkina (2010) also analyze a single merger 
(USAir and Piedmont in 1987) and find that prices rise by 5 to 6 percent on routes which were 
only served by one of the merging carriers and the other was a potential entrant, Kim and 
                                                                                                                                                        
approach is followed in studies by Knapp (1990), McGuckin et al. (1992), Singal (1996) and Slovin et al. 
(1991).  
10  It is important to note here that the observed price decrease is rather unexpected and might be explained by a 
general period of low demand at TWA’s St. Louis hub. For the NW-RC merger, Borenstein (1990) finds 
significant price increases of about 6 percent for NW or RC routes in which (a) competitor(s) remain after the 
merger and price increases of about 12 percent for NW or RC routes which became a monopoly post-merger.  
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Singal (1993) analyze the effects of fourteen U.S. airline mergers between 1985 and 1988 and 
find that relative fares on the merging firms’ routes rose by about 9.4 percent. Significant 
price increases were particularly found on routes in which the merging parties did not 
compete (directly) prior to the merger. They explain this observation by an increase in multi-
market contact triggered by the merger. Furthermore, the authors identified a substantial 
difference in the behavior of ‘mergers including a failing firm’ and ‘mergers without a failing 
firm’. Fares of failing airlines were found to be much lower on average before the merger, 
providing an explanation for the substantially larger price increases after the merger compared 
to cases of mergers between ‘healthy’ firms.  
 Partly due to the substantial reduction in merger activity in the 1990s and 2000s, existing 
research on the competitive effects of more recent U.S. airline mergers is very limited. From 
an ex-post perspective, Bilotkach (2011) investigates the America West – US Airways merger 
with a particular focus on its implications for multimarket contact (MMC). He finds that the 
merger changed the way that the airlines take into account the extent of MMC when making 
strategic choices as to frequency of service. From an ex-ante perspective, constant rumours of 
possible mega-mergers led to several policy studies on the possible effects of such mergers 
(see, e.g., U.S. General Accounting Office, 2001, U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
2010). However, academic contributions are restricted to a research paper by Benkard et al. 
(2010) in which the authors simulate the dynamic effects of three proposed horizontal U.S. 
airline mergers. Using data for 2003-2008, they find that a merger between two major hub 
carriers leads to increased entry by both other hub carriers and low cost carriers thereby 
offsetting some of the initial concentrating effects of the merger. 
 The existence of both a significant number of liquidations and mergers in recent years 
demands a detailed econometric investigation of the competitive effects of these firm exits. 
The following section provides such an analysis for the route exits caused by five liquidations 
and six mergers which took place in the domestic U.S. airline industry between 1998 and 
2010. 
4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
In this section, we present our empirical analysis. While Section 4.1 describes the 
construction of the dataset, Section 4.2 specifies our empirical approach and Section 4.3 
provides the descriptive statistics. Subsequently, Section 4.4 concentrates on the presentation 
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and interpretation of our main empirical results followed by the discussion of important 
policy implications in Section 4.5. 
4.1 CONSTRUCTION OF THE DATASET 
Our dataset was constructed by collecting and merging data from several sources. We use 
airline traffic data for the years from 1995 to 2011 from the U.S. DOT T-100 Domestic 
Segment database. This data contains monthly domestic non-stop segment data reported by 
U.S. air carriers when both origin and destination airports are located within the boundaries of 
the United States and its territories. We use T-100's information on origin, destination, non-
stop distance, available capacity, number of departures, and number of passengers to 
construct a quarterly panel data-set of non-directional non-stop route airport-pair markets. We 
drop airline-route observations with less than 12 quarterly departures and airline-route 
observations which were only served one quarter between 1995 and 2011. In addition, we use 
fare data from the U.S. DOT DB1B Market Origin and Destination Survey to enrich the 
constructed panel dataset with quarterly route-level fare data. In detail, the construction of the 
dataset can be subdivided into the following three subsequent steps. 
 In the first step, we identify all route exits of the 27 largest U.S. carriers11 which have been 
taken place between the 3rd quarter of 1995 and the 1st quarter of 2010. The quarter of exit is 
defined as the quarter following the quarter of the last occurrence of an airline-route 
observation in the dataset. Liquidation exits are all exits of the respective carrier which 
occurred in the quarter of firm liquidation (see Table 1 above). Merger-related exits are 
assumed to have taken place in the quarter after the closure of the merger transaction (see 
Table 2 above). 
 In the second step, we keep all non-stop routes which were subject to at least one exit 
(operational exit, liquidation exit or merger exit) and which are still served by another carrier 
after the exit of the respective carrier.12 If multiple exits on a certain non-stop route were 
observed over time, the route was duplicated. For each exit, we keep the eight quarters before 
and the eight quarters after the exit event to assess the effects of an exit using a ‘before-and-
after’ approach. We drop all routes for which we have less than seven observations before and 
seven observations after exit.  
                                                 
11  See footnote 7 above for a list of these 27 major U.S. carriers. 
12  If no non-stop service is provided after exit, route level effects cannot be observed. 
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 In the third step, we construct quarterly route level and airport level data from the T-100 
and DB1B databases.13 In calculating average non-stop fares, zero fares and abnormally high 
fares were excluded from the dataset. We only use average fares which are based on at least 
ten observations and thousand quarterly passengers. We add demographic information on the 
labor force, average income, and the number of establishments of the respective Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Applying this procedure, we arrive 
at a quarterly panel dataset of 1,258 non-stop routes allowing a detailed econometric 
investigation of the effects of firm exit.  
4.2 EMPIRICAL APPROACH  
Guided by our conceptual framework derived in Section 2 above, our empirical approach can 
be subdivided into five consecutive steps. In the first step, we use fixed effects regression 
models to estimate the short run effects of firm exit events on average market yield, 
departures and passengers.14 In the second step, we extend the observation window after exit 
and rerun the respective regressions for medium- and long-term in order to investigate 
possible changes, e.g., due to the realization of merger efficiencies. The third step introduces 
an interaction term allowing the effects of exit to differ on routes which became a monopoly 
post-exit. Subsequently, in the fourth step, we refrain from holding the number of carriers 
constant after an exit-event and examine the entry-inducing effects of firm exits. In the fifth 
and last step, we exclude the three large mergers (Delta Air Lines – Northwest Airlines, US 
Airways - America West Airlines and American Airlines – Trans World Airlines) from the 
analysis and rerun all regressions. This step allows us to investigate whether our results hold 
for the sub-sample of smaller mergers. 
 Discussing the technicalities of the five steps of our empirical approach in greater detail, 
our variables of interest are the exit variables which are captured by four dummy variables. 
We distinguish between two types of merger-related exits. In the first case, only the exiting 
carrier was active on the respective non-stop route and the resulting entity inherited this route. 
We call this a ‘route switching’ merger exit. In that case, the exit does not trigger a change in 
the number of carriers. If both of the two merging parties have provided non-stop service 
before, we call this an ‘overlapping route’ merger exit. This type differs from a merger exit 
with route switching since the number of competing carriers is reduced by one carrier. Exits 
                                                 
13  At this step, operations of regional carriers are merged with the operations of their respective network carrier. 
If a regional carrier operates flights for more than one network carrier, the network carrier is assigned on a 
route-by-route basis according to the hub airport involved. This procedure was cross-checked with 
information on the ticketing carrier on the respective routes provided by the DB1B database. 
14  We do not report the results for ‘seats’ as they are very closely related to ‘departures’.  
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which followed the liquidation of an airline are called liquidation exits. Operational exits are 
all other route exits which are not directly related to a firm exit. This category includes, e.g., 
network restructuring exits or exits due to unprofitability. Exits which were either observed in 
times of financial distress15 or took place before the merger was settled are also classified as 
operational exits. 
 Turning to our estimation approach, we first estimate several log-linear fixed effects 
regression models which can be denoted by 
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where yit is either the non-stop yield (fare per passenger mile), the number of departures or the 
number of passengers transported. The variable opEx captures operational exits, mExSw 
captures switching merger exits, mExOv captures merger exits on overlapping routes, and 
lqEx captures exits due to the liquidation of a carrier. The different exit dummies are zero 
before the exit event and become one in the quarter after exit and the subsequent quarter(s) 
depending on whether short-, medium-, or long-term effects shall be assessed. To capture the 
short-term effects of entry we compare non-stop fares, departures, and passengers eight 
quarters before exit with the first two quarters after exit. Thus, the exit variable is one for two 
quarters. Two quarters after exit the observation periods ends. Respectively, we capture 
medium-term effects by following prices and quantity four quarters after exit and long-term 
effects by following prices and quantities eight quarters after exit16. The introduction of such 
a ‘dynamic’ perspective allows us to investigate whether the observed short-term effects are 
permanent or rather disappear due to, e.g., realized merger efficiencies or competitive 
reactions by competitors. Thus, the coefficient estimates of the different exit variables report 
the average percentage change in prices and quantity after a certain type of exit. We further 
include a set of route-, airport- or MSA-specific control variables (X) as well as a yearly trend 
(year) and seasonal dummies (quarter).  
                                                 
15  Since it is unclear whether financial distress, e.g., filing for Chapter 11, ends in the liquidation of a firm, exits 
which occur before the liquidation of an airline are interpreted as operational exits since they basically aim at 
restoring profitability. As a consequence, the group of operational exits is quite heterogeneous. However, as 
we aim at using this category for the purpose of comparison only, we refrain from a further differentiation. 
16  Since the dataset covers the period up to the third quarter of 2011, the long-term effects of the Delta-
Northwest merger (and all other exits which took place either in the fourth quarter of 2009 or in the first 
quarter of 2010) refer to the first seven quarters after exit. 
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 As control variables, we include the number of carriers without the exiting carrier or 
merging parties (# airlines w/o exit) and the number of low-cost carriers, also without the 
exiting carrier or merging carriers (# LCCs w/o exit). These variables account for the effect of 
market structure over time. We further control for the average size of planes the carriers use to 
serve the route (avg. plane size) since costs should decline with an increasing capacity of the 
aircraft. When estimating the price effects of exit, we also include the average one-stop yield 
(ln(one-stop yield)) to account for possible price competition from connecting flights.17 We 
also control for the influence of airport size as measured by the mean of the two endpoint 
airports’ passenger share (airport size (mean)). Furthermore, three demographic variables on 
the MSA level enter the analysis which aim to capture demand effects. The labor force 
(ln(labor force) (mean)) shall capture potential total demand. The number of establishments 
(ln(# establ.) (mean)) is included to capture the demand of less price-sensitive business people 
and regional economic prosperity shall be captured by the average weekly wage in the 
respective MSAs (ln(avg. weekly wage) (mean)).    
 As it is reasonable to assume that the size of the competitive effects under investigation 
depends on the post-exit market structure, in a next step, we introduce an interaction term 
which allows isolating the effects of exits on routes which resulted in a monopoly post-exit. 
The fixed effects regression model becomes 
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 (2) 
In this model approach, the coefficients of the exit dummies alone denote the average 
percentage change in prices or quantities, respectively, if there are at least two competitors 
left directly after the exit event. If the market structure turns from a duopoly to a monopoly 
after the exit18, the effects of exit can be calculated as the sum of the respective coefficients 
(e.g., βopEx+ βopExM). 
                                                 
17  The one-stop yield is missing if either the route is not served via connecting flights or if there are not enough 
observations in DB1B data to be able to calculate a reliable mean (see section 4.1). In order to avoid losing a 
substantial amount of observations for regression analysis, an arbitrary value is assigned to these 
observations and an additional dummy variable is included which marks these observations (missing one-stop 
yield). This method is called dummy variable adjustment or missing indicator method and is frequently used 
in econometric analysis (Allison, 2001). 
18  The route might also stay a monopoly in case of switching route (merger) exits. 
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 For an assessment of possible entry-inducing effects of firm exit, in the fourth step, we 
estimate a similar model as specified in equation (1) above. The dependent variable becomes 
the change in the number of carriers other than the exiting one or the merging parties ( # 
airlines w/o exit). Accordingly, we refrain from holding the number of other carriers constant 
but include the lagged value of this variable since the previous competitive environment 
should largely determine entry activity of other carriers after exit events. 
 In the fifth and last step, we exclude the three large mergers (Delta Air Lines – Northwest 
Airlines, US Airways - America West Airlines and American Airlines – Trans World 
Airlines) from the analysis and rerun the regressions. This step allows us to investigate 
whether our results hold for the sub-sample of smaller mergers.  
4.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
As already mentioned in Section 4.1, the dataset covers 1,258 route exits. The majority of 
these exits are operational exits (918 exits). We further observe 217 merger exits on switching 
routes and 79 merger exits on overlapping routes. 44 exits occurred because of carrier 
liquidations. Directly after exit we observe that about 40 percent of the routes are monopolies 
(see Table 3). 
Table 3: Route exits included in the fixed effects regressions 
 # of exits share of post-exit monopolies 
operational exits 918 42.48% 
merger exits (switching) 217 27.65% 
merger exits (overlap) 79 46.84% 
liquidation exits 44 31.82% 
Total 1,258 39.83% 
    Sources: U.S. DOT, T-100 Domestic Segment Data, authors’ calculations. 
 
 About 28% of the switching route exits are monopolies. In contrast to the other exit types, 
these routes have also been monopolies before the exit event as no change in the number of 
carriers was triggered by the exit event. Further summary statistics for the variables included 
in the regressions can be retrieved from Table 4.  
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Table 4: Summary statistics 
 Quarter before/of exit Quarter after exit Period before exit Period after exit
Variable mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. 
         
ln(non-stop yield) 2.787 (0.652) 2.818 (0.651) 2.823 (0.658) 2.825 (0.650) 
non-stop yield 20.448 (16.323) 21.093 (16.684) 21.301 (16.994) 21.289 (17.089) 
ln(departures) 7.008 (0.809) 6.922 (0.877) 7.005 (0.826) 6.960 (0.860) 
Departures 1,497 (1,241) 1,425 (1,233) 1506 (1272) 1469 (1275) 
ln(Passengers) 11.416 (0.898) 11.306 (0.970) 11.434 (0.899) 11.361 (0.950) 
Passengers 131,621 (119,584) 123,061 (116,915) 133,567 (120637) 128,696 (121,496) 
 # airlines w/o exit 0.045 (0.332) 0.217 (0.485) 0.012 (0.294) 0.028 (0.329) 
         
operational exit - - 0.730 (0.444) - - 0.746 (0.436) 
merger exit (switching) - - 0.172 (0.378) - - 0.166 (0.372) 
merger exit (overlap) - - 0.063 (0.243) - - 0.052 (0.222) 
liquidation exit - - 0.035 (0.184) - - 0.036 (0.187) 
         
post-exit monopoly 0.398 (0.490) 0.398 (0.490) 0.398 (0.490) 0.393 (0.489) 
         
# airlines w/o exit 1.417 (1.000) 1.634 (1.013) 1.354 (1.005) 1.662 (0.977) 
# LCCs w/o exit 0.401 (0.551) 0.412 (0.563) 0.356 (0.526) 0.445 (0.592) 
avg. plane size 122.185 (41.045) 119.790 (43.943) 126.164 (40.056) 120.170 (44.180) 
ln(one-stop yield) 2.711 (1.077) 2.778 (0.950) 2.799 (0.960) 2.782 (0.970) 
missing one-stop yield 0.021 (0.142) 0.013 (0.112) 0.013 (0.113) 0.014 (0.116) 
         
airport size 1.890 (0.797) 1.881 (0.794) 1.899 (0.786) 1.886 (0.800) 
ln(# establ. ) 11.557 (0.714) 11.559 (0.715) 11.541 (0.714) 11.578 (0.718) 
ln(avg. weekly wage) 6.696 (0.174) 6.702 (0.167) 6.666 (0.175) 6.721 (0.164) 
ln(labor force) 14.465 (0.654) 14.467 (0.654) 14.455 (0.655) 14.478 (0.655) 
         
Year 2004 (3.802) 2004 (3.898) 2003 (3.880) 2005 (3.817) 
Quarter 2 0.208 (0.406) 0.183 (0.387) 0.250 (0.433) 0.258 (0.437) 
Quarter 3 0.297 (0.457) 0.208 (0.406) 0.250 (0.433) 0.240 (0.427) 
Quarter 4 0.312 (0.464) 0.297 (0.457) 0.249 (0.432) 0.244 (0.430) 
Observations 1,258 1,258 10,037 9,752 
Notes: Prices in 1995 $ cents. 
Sources: U.S. DOT, T-100 Domestic Segment Data, Airline Origin and Destination and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
authors’ calculations. 
 
 Our first dependent variable is the non-stop yield which is measured in real 1995 U.S. 
cents per passenger mile. As shown in Table 4, in the quarter before/of exit, a passenger paid 
about 20.4 cents per mile. The yield has risen to 21.1 cents per mile on average in the quarter 
after exit. Comparing the average price over the entire period before the exit (7-8 quarters) 
with the average price over the entire period after exit, we do not observe a price increase in 
real terms. The second dependent variable is the number of quarterly departures which 
amounts to 1,497 departures on average in the quarter before/of exit. It drops to 1,425 
departures in the quarter after exit. Although the extension of the observation period leads to a 
moderate increases in the number of departures, the pre-exit level remains unreached. The 
third dependent variable is the number of quarterly passengers. On average, about 132,000 
passengers have been transported in the quarter before/of exit. Over the quarter after exit the 
number of passengers drops to about 123,000 passengers. Although an extension of the 
analysis to the entire observation period after exit shows an increase in the number of 
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passengers, this increase again turns out to be insufficient to restore pre-exit levels. For the 
regressions which aim to assess the entry-inducing effect of exit, the fourth dependent 
variable is the change in the number of other carriers. While in the quarter before/of exit, this 
number amounts to 0.045 exits on average it increases to 0.217 exits in the quarter after exit. 
Both values experience a substantial drop if the analysis is extended to the entire period 
before/after exit.  
 Descriptive statistics distinguished by the type of exit are provided in Table 9 to Table 12 
in the Appendix. From these bivariate statistics the effect of exit seems to be more 
pronounced for operational and liquidation exits than for merger-related exits; this is true for 
price, quantity and entry-inducing effects. Interestingly, although bankrupt carriers were 
much smaller than most of the merging carriers, routes which are subject to the different exits 
do not differ substantially in size. Non-stop routes which were subject to a liquidation exit 
transported about 190,000 passengers in the quarter before/of exit, while routes subject to 
merger exits have been travelled less (switching: 161,000 passengers; overlapping: 129,000 
passengers) in the quarter before/of exit. 
4.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
Based on the description of our dataset and the empirical approach, this section presents our 
empirical results and interpretation. We subdivide our discussion into the reporting of the key 
empirical results for firm exits through liquidation and through merger. Results of the 
regressions with route fixed effects on non-stop yield can be retrieved from Table 5. Table 6 
depicts the results on the number of departures, and Table 7 presents the regression results 
with the number of passengers as our dependent variable. Each table is split into three panels. 
The first panel shows the short-term regressions, the second panel shows the medium-term 
regressions, and the third panel shows the long-term regressions. Within each panel, the first 
column does not include the post-exit monopoly interaction term while the second column 
does. The effects for operational exits are included for the purpose of comparison.19 
4.4.1 FIRM EXIT THROUGH LIQUIDATION 
In the short run, exit through liquidation is found to have a substantial effect on market yield. 
On average, prices increase by 12 percent in the first two quarters after exit. When allowing 
for differences regarding the post-exit market structure, the effect does not differ significantly 
                                                 
19  An average operational exit is found to have a similar ceteris paribus effect on non-stop yield in the short-, 
medium-, and long-term. After an operational exit, non-stop yield increase by 6 percent on average, the 
number of departures decrease by 19 to 20 percent, and passengers transported drop by about 17 percent. 
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between post-exit monopolies and routes with at least two competitors. Interestingly, the 
effect is found to be persistent over time. The substantial size of the effects of liquidation 
exits on price and quantity measures can be substantiated by a direct comparison to the results 
for the ‘operational exit’ group: in the short run, we find an average yield increase of about 6 
percent which turns out to be quite robust for a narrower focus on monopoly routes post-exit, 
extensions of the observation window and the sub-sample containing only small mergers. 
 Turning from price effects to quantity effects, it is found that firm exits due to liquidation 
lead to the expected large decrease in capacity and demand. In the short run, liquidation exits 
cause an average decrease in the number of departures of 17.4 percent and an average 
decrease in demand of 14.8 percent. The effect for the number of passengers is significantly 
and substantially higher if only monopoly routes post-exit are taken into account (-28.4 
percent) compared to an effect of -7.5 percent for routes with more than one competitor. 
Again, the results appear to be quite robust for extensions of the observation window and the 
sub-sample containing only smaller mergers. Interestingly, while price effects of exits due to 
firm liquidations were significantly higher than the price effects of operational exits, the 
quantity effects do not significantly differ between liquidation exits and operational exits. 
 Assessing the effect of liquidation exits on market entry, we find a substantial effect 
already in the short-run (see Table 8). The change in the number of carrier increases by 0.130 
after a liquidation exit and controlling for other factors. This effect is smaller than for 
operational exits (0.192), but the two effects do not differ significantly. Again, the effect is 
persistent over time. In general, since market entry is expected to create a downward pressure 
on price (see, e.g., Hüschelrath and Müller, 2011, or Daraban and Fournier, 2009), the entry 
activity of other carriers induced by multiple market exits of liquidated carriers should act as a 
countervailing force regarding price increases and quantity reductions. However, consulting 
our descriptive results reported in Table 12 in the Appendix, it becomes apparent that the 
induced entry activity is not sufficient to fully compensate the price increase observed 
immediately after a liquidation exit. Even adjusted for inflation, we observe the yield to be 
about 1 cent per mile (in 1995$ terms) higher in the period after exit than in the period before 
exit (see Table 12). 
 In a nutshell, our empirical findings imply that, even if the total share of the failed firms’ 
domestic passengers was negligible, these firms’ market exits had a significant impact on the 
respective routes. These markets suffered, ceteris paribus, from substantial price increases and 
service reductions (in the form of lower flight frequencies). However, incentives for entry 
seem to be high since there is a substantial increase in the change of the number of other 
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carriers immediately after the observed liquidation exits. This finding suggests that liquidation 
exits may (at least partly) cause a welfare-improving replacement of the inefficient bankrupt 
carrier with a more efficient operating airline. However, this comes at a cost for consumers as 
entries after liquidation exits cannot fully reverse the price increase observed immediately 
after exit.  
 
 
Table 5: Fixed effects regressions for the effect of exits on non-stop yield 
 ln(non-stop yield) - short-term ln(non-stop yield) - medium term ln(non-stop yield) - long term
Variable coef.  (s.e.) coef.  (s.e.) coef.  (s.e.) coef.  (s.e.) coef.  (s.e.) coef.  (s.e.) 
                   
operational exit 0.060 *** (0.005) 0.055*** (0.006) 0.067*** (0.005) 0.059*** (0.006) 0.061*** (0.005) 0.054*** (0.006) 
merger exit (switching) 0.027 *** (0.008) 0.036*** (0.009) 0.027*** (0.009) 0.040*** (0.009) 0.010 (0.010) 0.030*** (0.010) 
merger exit (overlap) 0.056 *** (0.015) 0.025 (0.024) 0.047*** (0.016) 0.029 (0.023) 0.027 (0.018) 0.022 (0.024) 
liquidation exit 0.120 *** (0.017) 0.106*** (0.020) 0.127*** (0.016) 0.114*** (0.018) 0.117*** (0.017) 0.109*** (0.019) 
              
op. exit # monopoly    0.013 (0.009)   0.018** (0.009)   0.016* (0.009) 
m. ex. (sw.) # monopoly    -0.034** (0.017)   -0.047** (0.019)   -0.071*** (0.022) 
m. ex. (ov.) # monopoly    0.068** (0.029)   0.037 (0.030)   0.009 (0.035) 
liq. exit # monopoly    0.042 (0.035)   0.040 (0.036)   0.025 (0.036) 
              
# airlines w/o exit -0.021 *** (0.006) -0.020*** (0.006) -0.023*** (0.005) -0.021*** (0.005) -0.035*** (0.005) -0.034*** (0.005) 
# LCCs w/o exit -0.101 *** (0.014) -0.100*** (0.014) -0.103*** (0.012) -0.102*** (0.012) -0.093*** (0.011) -0.092*** (0.011) 
avg. plane size -0.001 *** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) 
ln(one-stop yield) 0.377 *** (0.025) 0.376*** (0.025) 0.404*** (0.023) 0.403*** (0.023) 0.387*** (0.029) 0.386*** (0.029) 
missing one-stop yield 2.600 *** (0.176) 2.592*** (0.177) 2.798*** (0.166) 2.791*** (0.166) 2.672*** (0.206) 2.663*** (0.205) 
              
airport size (mean) -0.033 * (0.019) -0.034* (0.019) -0.018 (0.018) -0.021 (0.018) 0.013 (0.019) 0.008 (0.019) 
ln(# establ. ) (mean) 0.463 *** (0.092) 0.461*** (0.093) 0.421*** (0.084) 0.414*** (0.086) 0.247*** (0.075) 0.232*** (0.076) 
ln(avg. weekly wage) 0.228 *** (0.050) 0.227*** (0.050) 0.216*** (0.046) 0.211*** (0.046) 0.254*** (0.048) 0.245*** (0.047) 
ln(labor force) (mean) 0.579 *** (0.188) 0.584*** (0.189) 0.528*** (0.183) 0.514*** (0.184) 0.490*** (0.167) 0.459*** (0.167) 
              
Year -0.055 *** (0.004) -0.055*** (0.004) -0.048*** (0.004) -0.048*** (0.004) -0.031*** (0.003) -0.031*** (0.003) 
Quarter 2 -0.014 *** (0.003) -0.015*** (0.003) -0.013*** (0.003) -0.013*** (0.003) -0.006** (0.003) -0.007** (0.003) 
Quarter 3 -0.039 *** (0.004) -0.038*** (0.004) -0.031*** (0.004) -0.031*** (0.004) -0.023*** (0.003) -0.024*** (0.003) 
Quarter 4 -0.069 *** (0.005) -0.069*** (0.005) -0.061*** (0.005) -0.060*** (0.005) -0.052*** (0.004) -0.052*** (0.004) 
Constant 96.151 *** (7.352) 96.335*** (7.394) 84.022*** (6.470) 83.689*** (6.498) 52.762*** (5.093) 52.069*** (5.081) 
R2 (within/between/overall) 0.283/0.109/0.110 0.285/0.108/0.109 0.287/0.141/0.142 0.289/0.147/0.147 0.267/0.199/0.200 0.270/0.222/0.223 
Observations 12,553 12,553 15,069 15,069 19,789 19,789 
Routes 1,258 1,258 1,258 1,258 1,258 1,258 
Notes: Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Sources: U.S. DOT, T-100 Domestic Segment Data, Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, authors’ calculations. 
Table 6: Fixed effects regressions for the effect of exits on number of departures 
 ln(departures) - short term ln(departures) - medium term ln(departures) - long term
Variable coef.  (s.e.) coef.  (s.e.) coef.  (s.e.) coef.  (s.e.) coef.  (s.e.) coef.  (s.e.) 
                   
operational exit -0.200 *** (0.011) -0.123*** (0.011) -0.192*** (0.011) -0.121*** (0.011) -0.189*** (0.011) -0.129*** (0.012) 
merger exit (switching) -0.021 * (0.012) -0.023 (0.014) -0.026** (0.012) -0.036*** (0.013) -0.035*** (0.013) -0.045*** (0.015) 
merger exit (overlap) -0.031 * (0.017) -0.055*** (0.019) -0.033* (0.017) -0.059*** (0.021) -0.046** (0.018) -0.076*** (0.023) 
liquidation exit -0.174 *** (0.032) -0.146*** (0.036) -0.175*** (0.029) -0.149*** (0.034) -0.180*** (0.030) -0.165*** (0.038) 
              
Op. exit # monopoly    -0.170*** (0.024)   -0.158*** (0.022)   -0.137*** (0.021) 
m. ex. (sw.) # monopoly    0.002 (0.027)   0.033 (0.027)   0.041 (0.028) 
m. ex. (ov.) # monopoly    0.048 (0.032)   0.051 (0.032)   0.064* (0.035) 
liq. exit # monopoly    -0.079 (0.070)   -0.073 (0.054)   -0.039 (0.053) 
              
# airlines w/o exit 0.151 *** (0.014) 0.137*** (0.014) 0.149*** (0.014) 0.137*** (0.014) 0.142*** (0.014) 0.137*** (0.014) 
# LCCs w/o exit 0.089 *** (0.025) 0.088*** (0.025) 0.106*** (0.023) 0.103*** (0.023) 0.106*** (0.020) 0.101*** (0.020) 
Avg. plane size -0.003 *** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.000) 
              
airport size (mean) 0.773 *** (0.044) 0.776*** (0.043) 0.780*** (0.045) 0.786*** (0.043) 0.788*** (0.043) 0.791*** (0.041) 
ln(# establ. ) (mean) 0.201  (0.170) 0.123 (0.168) 0.332** (0.166) 0.236 (0.162) 0.368** (0.152) 0.286* (0.149) 
ln(avg. weekly wage) (mean) 0.527 *** (0.093) 0.530*** (0.092) 0.594*** (0.089) 0.606*** (0.088) 0.587*** (0.087) 0.605*** (0.086) 
ln(labor force) (mean) 0.443  (0.359) 0.452 (0.358) 0.234 (0.350) 0.285 (0.351) 0.001 (0.319) 0.068 (0.319) 
              
Year -0.005  (0.008) -0.003 (0.007) -0.005 (0.007) -0.004 (0.007) -0.004 (0.006) -0.003 (0.006) 
Quarter 2 0.061 *** (0.006) 0.062*** (0.006) 0.060*** (0.006) 0.061*** (0.006) 0.062*** (0.006) 0.063*** (0.006) 
Quarter 3 0.061 *** (0.009) 0.062*** (0.009) 0.062*** (0.008) 0.063*** (0.008) 0.060*** (0.007) 0.062*** (0.007) 
Quarter 4 -0.003  (0.008) -0.001 (0.008) -0.008 (0.008) -0.007 (0.008) -0.008 (0.007) -0.007 (0.007) 
Constant 2.945  (13.034) 0.935 (12.989) 4.803 (12.092) 3.239 (11.992) 5.197 (9.959) 4.357 (9.889) 
              
R2 (within/between/overall) 0.216/0.296/0.285 0.230/0.303/0.293 0.232/0.310/0.298 0.248/0.318/0.307 0.249/0.339/0.326 0.262/0.347/0.334 
Observations 12,553 12,553 15,069 15,069 19,789 19,789 
Routes 1,258 1,258 1,258 1,258 1,258 1,258 
Notes: Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Sources: U.S. DOT, T-100 Domestic Segment Data and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 7: Fixed effects regressions for the effect of exits on number of passengers 
 ln(passengers) – short term ln(passengers) – medium term ln(passengers) – long term
Variable coef.  (s.e). coef.  (s.e) coef.  (s.e) coef.  (s.e) coef.  (s.e) coef.  (s.e) 
              
operational exit -0.172 *** (0.011) -0.097*** (0.011) -0.167*** (0.011) -0.095*** (0.011) -0.170*** (0.011) -0.108*** (0.011) 
merger exit (switching) -0.042 *** (0.012) -0.040*** (0.013) -0.044*** (0.012) -0.055*** (0.013) -0.051*** (0.013) -0.066*** (0.014) 
merger exit (overlap) -0.053 *** (0.016) -0.059*** (0.019) -0.043** (0.017) -0.051** (0.022) -0.066*** (0.019) -0.080*** (0.024) 
liquidation exit -0.148 *** (0.040) -0.075** (0.037) -0.159*** (0.039) -0.091** (0.037) -0.179*** (0.036) -0.129*** (0.040) 
              
Op. exit # monopoly    -0.166*** (0.024)   -0.160*** (0.022)   -0.143*** (0.021) 
m. ex. (sw.) # monopoly    -0.010 (0.026)   0.040 (0.026)   0.057** (0.027) 
m. ex. (ov.) # monopoly    0.008 (0.031)   0.014 (0.033)   0.030 (0.036) 
liq. exit # monopoly    -0.219** (0.091)   -0.205** (0.084)   -0.149** (0.069) 
              
# airlines w/o exit 0.135 *** (0.013) 0.122*** (0.013) 0.133*** (0.013) 0.121*** (0.013) 0.129*** (0.013) 0.124*** (0.012) 
# LCCs w/o exit 0.115 *** (0.026) 0.113*** (0.026) 0.133*** (0.023) 0.128*** (0.023) 0.133*** (0.021) 0.126*** (0.021) 
Avg. plane size 0.005 *** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 
              
airport size (mean) 1.051 *** (0.047) 1.052*** (0.046) 1.032*** (0.048) 1.036*** (0.046) 0.996*** (0.045) 0.999*** (0.044) 
ln(# establ. ) (mean) 0.192  (0.168) 0.121 (0.163) 0.385** (0.163) 0.298* (0.157) 0.477*** (0.150) 0.400*** (0.147) 
ln(avg. weekly wage) (mean) 0.367 *** (0.096) 0.366*** (0.095) 0.475*** (0.092) 0.484*** (0.091) 0.513*** (0.088) 0.529*** (0.088) 
ln(labor force) (mean) 0.725 ** (0.359) 0.709** (0.357)   0.431 (0.347)   0.179 (0.314) 
              
Year 0.004  (0.008) 0.006 (0.008) 0.003 (0.007) 0.004 (0.007) 0.006 (0.006) 0.007 (0.006) 
Quarter 2 0.143 *** (0.007) 0.144*** (0.007) 0.143*** (0.007) 0.144*** (0.007) 0.147*** (0.006) 0.148*** (0.006) 
Quarter 3 0.130 *** (0.009) 0.130*** (0.009) 0.132*** (0.008) 0.133*** (0.008) 0.133*** (0.008) 0.134*** (0.008) 
Quarter 4 0.035 *** (0.008) 0.036*** (0.008) 0.026*** (0.008) 0.028*** (0.008) 0.028*** (0.007) 0.029*** (0.007) 
Constant -14.581  (13.345) -17.182 (13.301) -10.094 (12.454) -12.047 (12.378) -14.374 (10.294) -15.403  (10.280) 
                   
R2 (within/between/overall) 0.296/0.352/0.340 0.308/0.361/0.350 0.296/0.375/0.361 0.311/0.382/0.369 0.294/0.405/0.388 0.307/0.410/0.394 
Observations 12,553 12,553 15,069 15,069 19,789 19,789 
Routes 1,258 1,258 1,258 1,258 1,258 1,258 
Notes: Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Sources: U.S. DOT, T-100 Domestic Segment Data and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, authors’ calculations. 
Table 8: Fixed effects regressions for the effects of exits on entry 
  # airlines w/o 
exiting/merger –  
short term 
 # airlines w/o 
exiting/merger – 
medium term 
 # airlines w/o 
exiting/merger  -  
long term 
Variable coef.  (s.e.) coef.  (s.e.) coef.  (s.e.) 
          
operational exit 0.192*** (0.014) 0.152*** (0.012) 0.141 *** (0.011) 
merger exit (switching) -0.017 (0.014) 0.011 (0.012) 0.056 *** (0.011) 
merger exit (overlap) 0.003 (0.024) 0.012 (0.018) 0.049 *** (0.016) 
liquidation exit 0.130*** (0.042) 0.107** (0.044) 0.137 *** (0.040) 
        
# airlines w/o exit (lag) -0.392*** (0.017) -0.350*** (0.014) -0.303 *** (0.012) 
# LCCs w/o exit (lag) -0.045 (0.029) -0.028 (0.025) -0.021  (0.020) 
Avg. plane size -0.003*** (0.000) -0.003*** (0.000) -0.003 *** (0.000) 
        
airport size (mean) 0.325*** (0.042) 0.297*** (0.037) 0.268 *** (0.029) 
ln(# establ. ) (mean) 0.047 (0.236) 0.069 (0.194) 0.049  (0.126) 
ln(avg. weekly wage) (mean) 0.161 (0.117) 0.020 (0.097) -0.010  (0.080) 
ln(labor force) -1.633*** (0.389) -1.273*** (0.329) -0.923 *** (0.237) 
        
Year 0.025*** (0.008) 0.009 (0.007) -0.009 ** (0.005) 
Quarter 2 0.022** (0.009) 0.013 (0.008) 0.015 ** (0.007) 
Quarter 3 -0.017* (0.009) -0.028*** (0.008) -0.026 *** (0.007) 
Quarter 4 0.018* (0.011) 0.015 (0.010) 0.008  (0.008) 
Constant -27.270** (13.365) -0.367 (12.281) 31.832 *** (8.924) 
          
R2 (within/between/overall) 0.214 / 0.001 / 0.004 0.191 / 0.000 / 0.005 0.170 / 0.001 / 0.007 
Observations 12,512 15,028 19,748 
Routes 1,258 1,258 1,258 
Notes: Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Sources: U.S. DOT, T-100 Domestic Segment Data and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, authors’ calculations. 
 
4.4.2 FIRM EXIT THROUGH MERGER 
Following our conceptual framework derived in Section 2, the analysis of the effects of firm 
exits through merger must differentiate between two route types: overlapping routes and 
switching routes. In the short run, exit through merger has a significant effect on both route 
types: while prices increase by on average about 5.6 percent on overlapping routes, switching 
routes experience a yield increase of about 2.7 percent. The extension of the observation 
window, however, reveals that these effects vanish in the long run. While effects are still 
significantly different from zero in the medium term, prices are not significantly higher for 
both types of merger exits in the long term. 
 Interestingly, if the focus is narrowed down to monopoly routes post-exit, the effect on 
switching routes is found to be zero (as the coefficient of the interaction term is negatively 
significant and of approximately the same absolute size) in the short run and even negative (-
4.1 percent) in the long run. While the above effect on overlapping routes is in the short run 
mostly driven by post-exit monopolies, results diverge in the medium and long run. The 
extension of the observation window reveals that the effect is of only half the size and no 
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longer significant. For the sub-sample of small mergers (see Table 13), we do not find any 
significant effects of merger exits on average yield. While one should refrain from 
interpreting the results for overlapping routes due to the low number of observations in this 
category20, the insignificant effect found on switching routes is not surprising since the 
possible drivers for the positive effect in case of larger mergers, i.e., reduced competition due 
to multimarket contact and the elimination of potential entrants, might be negligible for small 
firm acquisitions. 
 Turning from the price effects to the quantity effects (see Table 6 and Table 7), it is found 
that firm exits through merger lead to smaller reductions in capacity and demand than 
liquidation-related and operational exits. In the short run, the number of departures is reduced 
by about 3.1 percent on overlapping routes and 2.1 percent on switching routes. In markets 
which turn to a monopoly post-exit, we fail to find any significant effect (for both route types) 
on the number of departures since the sum of the coefficients is not significantly different 
from zero (as indicated by the Wald test). Demand declines in both cases, however, the effects 
do not significantly differ between post-exit monopolies and post-exit oligopolies. 
Furthermore, these demand decreases in post-exit monopolies are only found in the short term 
as the sum of the merger exit coefficients and the coefficients of the respective interaction 
terms are not significantly different from zero in the medium and long run. In contrast, the 
analysis of the non-monopoly routes provides a different picture. The short-term reductions in 
the number of departures and the number of passengers are found to be even more 
pronounced in the medium and long run: the reduction in the number of departures increase 
from about 5.5 percent (short-term) to 7.6 percent (long-term) for the overlapping routes and 
from about 2.3 percent (short-term, insignificant) to 4.5 percent (long-term, highly significant) 
for the switching routes. For the sub-sample of smaller mergers (see Table 14 and Table 15), 
the quantity effects found for the switching routes in non-monopoly markets are even more 
pronounced than for the whole sample showing reductions in the number of departures from 
7.2 percent in the short-term to 9.3 percent in the long-term and reductions in the number of 
passengers from 7.3 percent in the short-term to 10 percent in the long-term. 
 Regarding potential entry-inducing effects, we find that the change in the number of 
carriers does not react after merger-related exits in the short- and medium-term, but increases 
                                                 
20  After excluding the exits of the six carriers involved in the large mergers, 38 routes for merger exits on 
switching routes, 9 routes for merger exits on overlapping routes and 799 routes for operational exits remain 
in the dataset.  
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by 0.056 carriers (switching routes) and 0.049 carriers (overlapping routes) in the long-term. 
On the contrary, for the sub-sample of small-mergers (see Table 16) we find that entry 
materializes even in the medium and short run. Furthermore, the entry-inducing effects of 
small mergers are substantially larger than for the group of all mergers and of similar size as 
the entry-inducing effects of liquidation exits and operational exits. As we see from the 
descriptive statistics both for the merger exits with route switching (Table 10) and the merger 
exits on overlapping routes (Table 11), the countervailing effect of induced entries seems to 
be sufficient to drive down real prices (at least in the long term) to pre-exit levels. 
 In a nutshell, our analysis of the effects of merger-related firm exits shows that price 
increases and quantity reductions are not only an issue on the overlapping parts of the 
merging firm’s networks but can also play a role on its complementary parts (so-called 
switching routes). These results support previous findings on reduced competition due to an 
increase in multimarket contact, however, might also be explained by changes in the pricing 
strategy of the acquired carrier, increased airport dominance, or the increase in quality 
achieved by the interconnection of the two networks. Interestingly, in case of monopoly 
routes (in which prices have already been high before the merger was settled) we do not 
observe any price increases post-merger but even a price decrease in the long run. Although 
this finding might not be too surprising – basically because the merged entity would reduce 
profits by raising the price above the existing monopoly level – the observed yield reductions 
can be interpreted as an indication for the realization of merger efficiencies (which also a 
monopolist is partly passing-on downstream to the final customers in the form of price 
reductions). 
 The observed effects on overlapping routes are largely found to be driven by the large 
mergers (especially the Delta Air Lines – Northwest Airlines merger) since networks have 
been (almost) fully complementary for the smaller mergers. Although quantity effects have 
been persistent and concentration has risen substantially, the price effects are mostly found in 
the short run and vanish over time. This can also be interpreted as a further indication for 
realized merger efficiencies.  
 Entry is found to take place rather quickly in case of liquidation exits and small mergers. 
However, for the entire group of mergers entry-inducing effects only materialize in the long 
run. It can therefore be concluded that particularly large mergers appear to (temporarily) 
reduce the incentives of other carriers to enter the respective routes. This observation is 
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reasonable as the merger led to increased market shares of the merged entity thereby, ceteris 
paribus, reducing the entry incentives of competitors. However, in the long run, entry might 
become attractive again, e.g., due to restructuring activities of the merged carrier and/or 
quality problems that materialize during the post-merger integration process. 
4.5 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Our empirical results allow the derivation of several important policy conclusions especially 
for unilateral effects analysis as part of horizontal merger assessments. First, given our result 
that the price and quantity effects of liquidation exits are much more pronounced than the 
respective effects of merger-related exits, on the surface, it could be concluded that avoiding 
liquidation through merger benefits consumers and society. In other words, our results 
apparently support the so-called failing firm defense which allows the clearance of (partly) 
anticompetitive mergers in cases in which one of the merging firms is at the verge of 
bankruptcy. However, despite the obvious advantages of smaller price increases and better 
service options, the net welfare effects of such ‘failing firm mergers’ remain unclear, e.g., due 
to possible negative effects on the merged carrier and the industry triggered by the prevention 
of the exit of (inefficient) capacity from the industry (and dissuading entry by potential 
competitors) or substantial problems in the integration of the merging carriers. Furthermore, it 
must be reminded that our data set only contains mergers which have been approved by the 
Department of Justice (DOJ). Although wrong decisions on the side of the DOJ cannot be 
ruled out completely, it seems very unlikely that the approved mergers were in fact 
anticompetitive and should have been prohibited. 
 Second, with respect to mergers, our results reveal that larger mergers, ceteris paribus, lead 
to significant and partly permanent price increases first and foremost not – as expected by 
theory – on the overlapping parts of the route network but on routes in which the operating 
airline simply switched as a consequence of the merger. Any analyst studying the competitive 
effects of a horizontal merger is therefore well advised to consider potential effects not only 
on the overlapping part of the network but on non-overlapping parts as well in order to come 
to meaningful conclusions on the unilateral effects of the merger proposal. 
 Third, still focusing on mergers, we find evidence for the realization of merger efficiencies 
for large mergers only. While in the short run, significant price increases on both switching 
and overlapping routes were observed, these effects either disappear or are reduced 
substantially in the long run. As we control for the number of firms (and the other key yield 
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drivers) in our regressions, the observed price reductions must be associated with the 
realization and the pass-on of merger efficiencies. Furthermore, our finding of significant 
price reductions for the case of monopoly routes – in which by definition competition is 
excluded as alternative driver of price reductions – can be interpreted as further indication for 
the existence of merger efficiencies which are (at least partly) passed on to the customers in 
the form of lower prices. Although antitrust policy might still be well-advised to keep up the 
rather skeptical approach with respect to merger efficiencies when it comes to a weighting of 
pro- and anticompetitive effects as part of the merger control procedure, our study suggests 
that these efficiencies are existent to a degree that allows the reversion of the price increases 
observed immediately after the completion of the merger.    
 Fourth, our analysis shows that especially large mergers have an entry-dissuading effect in 
the short and medium run. In contrast, liquidation-related exits are found to cause immediate 
entry-inducing effects. Although an econometric analysis of the price effects of these 
subsequent entries is beyond the scope of this paper, theory and descriptive evidence 
presented above suggests for the group of merger-related exits that they are strong enough to 
reverse the short-term price increases post-merger.21 Although this finding is an encouraging 
sign for the workability of competition in the U.S. airline industry, horizontal merger 
assessments remain an important part of public policy in the U.S. airline industry. This is 
particularly true as our merger sample only includes mergers with largely complementary 
networks (which received antitrust clearance beforehand) and other (potentially 
anticompetitive) mergers would have faced severe difficulties to receive clearance from the 
antitrust authority.22 
                                                 
21  For the group of liquidation-related exits, our analysis reveals that entry activities cannot drive average prices 
down to the pre-exit level.   
22  For example, the European Commission (EC) recently prohibited two mergers which both involved shared 
hubs: Dublin in case of the Ryanair-Aer Lingus merger proposal (Case No COMP/M.4439, decided in 2007) 
and Athens in case of the Olympic Air-Aegean Airlines merger proposal (Case No COMP/M.5830, decided 
in 2011). In both cases, the EC concluded that (route) competition would be harmed substantially by the 
mergers and therefore prohibited the transactions. In the United States, several merger proposals were 
abandoned after the DOJ signaled competition concerns. For example, in 2001, United Airlines and US Air 
ended their merger plans after the DOJ announced its intent to block the transaction (see, e.g., U.S. General 
Accounting Office, 2001 for an analysis of the expected competitive effects of the proposed merger). Three 
years earlier, in 1998, a proposal of Northwest Airlines’ to acquire Continental Airlines received similar 
signals from the DOJ and was subsequently abandoned.   
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5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In the last decade, the domestic U.S. airline industry has experienced a substantial 
consolidation trend. In addition to a number of high level mergers such as American Airlines 
– Trans World Airlines (2001), America West – US Airways (2005) and Delta Air Lines – 
Northwest Airlines (2009), several smaller carriers such as National Airlines (2002), 
Independence Air (2006) and ATA Airlines (2008) had to leave the industry. 
 Despite this high relevance of firm exits for the recent development of the domestic U.S. 
airline industry, empirical evidence on the effects of these consolidations is rare. Studies 
focusing on the market impact of liquidations do not exist to the best of our knowledge and 
existing studies on the competitive effects of airline mergers almost exclusively stem from the 
1980s and focus on the specific case of a largely overlapping route network of the merging 
parties (due to a shared hub). However, such a network structure is rather uncommon in recent 
mergers and therefore raises the demand for both a new conceptual framework for 
investigating firm exits in the airline industry and a corresponding new empirical analysis of 
the effects of such firm exits. 
 Against this background, we study the effects of firm exits on prices, different measures of 
quantity and entry in the domestic U.S. airline industry from 1995 to 2010. Applying fixed 
effects models we find that liquidation-related exits have, in the short run, a substantial effect 
on average yield. Interestingly, the effect is found to be persistent over time. Turning to the 
effects on quantity, our analysis reveals that firm exits due to liquidation lead to a large 
decrease in capacity and demand. Furthermore, a large and quite persistent entry-inducing 
effect is observed shortly after liquidation exits. 
 The effects of merger-related exits are assessed for two different route types: overlapping 
routes and switching routes (i.e., routes which experience a merger-induced switch of the 
operating airline). In the short run, estimation results show a significant price increase on both 
route types. In the long run, however, it is found that these price increases vanish. Prices even 
decrease on switching monopoly routes. Both findings can be interpreted as clear indications 
for the realization and pass-on of merger efficiencies. The capacity and demand reductions 
following firm exit through merger are generally smaller than those for liquidation-related 
exits. Entry is only induced to a small degree in the long run. However, for the sub-sample of 
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small mergers moderate entry takes place relatively early after the completion of the merger. 
 Finally, it is worth mentioning that our approach to study the competitive effects of firm 
exit allows the derivation of several avenues for future research. In addition to possible 
changes in the empirical strategy or the application of alternative estimation approaches, a 
particularly interesting research area is econometric case studies of the effects of particularly 
large mergers. Such investigations would not only allow a much more detailed assessment of 
the competitive effects, e.g., through the construction of much more detailed route categories, 
but would also enable ex-post evaluations of the respective merger decisions of the antitrust 
authority. Such case-study related research is therefore likely to create important positive 
spillover effects on the welfare-improving impact of antitrust policy in general and the quality 
of future merger assessments in particular.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 32
REFERENCES 
Allison, P. (2001), Missing Data, Thousand Oaks.  
Baumol, W., J. Panzar and R. Willig (1982), Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry 
Structure, San Diego.  
Benkard, L., A. Bodoh-Creed and J. Lazarev (2010), Simulating the Dynamic Effects of 
Horizontal Mergers: U.S. Airlines, Working Paper, Stanford University, Palo Alto.  
Beutel, P. and M. McBride (1992), Market Power and the Northwest-Republic Airline 
Merger: A Residual Demand Approach, Southern Economic Journal, 58, 709-720. 
Bilotkach, V. (2011), Multimarket Contact and Intensity of Competition: Evidence from an 
Airline Merger, Review of Industrial Organization, 38, 95-115. 
Borenstein, S. (1990), Airline Mergers, Airport Dominance, and Market Power, American 
Economic Review-Papers and Proceedings, 80, 400-404. 
Borenstein, S. and N. Rose (2008), How Airline Markets Work…Or Do They? Regulatory 
Reform in the Airline Industry, forthcoming in: Rose, N., Economic Regulation and Its 
Reform: What Have We Learned?, Chicago.  
Borenstein, S. and N. Rose (2003), The Impact of Bankruptcy on Airline Service Levels, 
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 93, 415-419.  
Borenstein, S. and N. Rose (1995), Bankruptcy and Pricing in U.S. Airline Markets, 
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 85, 397-402.  
Brueckner, J., N. Dyer and P. Spiller (1992), Fare Determination in Airline Hub-and-Spoke 
Networks, RAND Journal of Economics, 23, 309-333. 
Busse, M. (2002), Firm Financial Condition and Airline Price Wars, RAND Journal of 
Economics, 33, 298-318. 
Butler, R. and J. Huston (1989), Merger Mania and Airline Fares, Eastern Economic Journal, 
15, 7-16. 
Ciliberto, F. and C. Schenone (2008), Bankruptcy and Product-Market Competition: Evidence 
from the Airline Industry, Working Paper, University of Virginia. 
Daraban, B. and G. Fournier (2008), Incumbent Responses to Low-Cost Airline Entry and 
Exit: A Spatial Autoregressive Panel Data Analysis, Research in Transportation 
Economics, 24, 15-24. 
Geroski, P. A. (1991). Market Dynamics and Entry. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Geroski, P. A. (1995). What Do We Know About Entry? International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, 13, pp. 421-440. 
Hüschelrath, K. and K. Müller (2011), Patterns and Effects of Entry in U.S. Airline Markets, 
Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, forthcoming. 
 
 33
Jordan, W. (1988), Problems Stemming from Airline Mergers and Acquisitions, 
Transportation Journal, 27, 9-30. 
Kim, E. and V. Singal (1993), Mergers and Market Power: Evidence from the Airline 
Industry, American Economic Review, 83, 549-569. 
Knapp, W. (1990), Event Analysis of Air Carrier Mergers and Acquisitions, Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 57, 703-707. 
Kwoka, J. and E. Shumilkina (2010), The Price Effect of Eliminating Potential Competition: 
Evidence from an Airline Merger, Journal of Industrial Economics, 58, 767-793. 
McGuckin, R., F. Warren-Boulton and P. Waldstein (1992), The Use of Stock Market Returns 
in Antitrust Analysis of Mergers, Review of Industrial Organization, 7, 1-11. 
Morrison, S. (1996), Airline Mergers - A Longer View, Journal of Transport Economics and 
Policy, 30, 237-250. 
Schumpeter, J. A. (1942). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper & 
Brothers Publishers. 
Singal, V. (1996), Airline Mergers and Competition: An Integration of Stock and Product 
Price Effects, Journal of Business, 69, 233-268. 
Slovin, M., M. Sushka and C. Hudson (1991), Deregulation, Contestability, and Airline 
Acquisitions, Journal of Financial Economics, 30, 231-251. 
U.S. General Accounting Office (2001), Airline Competition – Issues Raised by 
Consolidation Proposals, GAO-01-370T, Washington D.C. 
U.S. Government Accountability Office (2010), Airline Mergers – Issues Raised by the 
Proposed Merger of United and Continental Airlines, GAO-10-778T, Washington D.C. 
Werden, G., L. Froeb (1998), The Entry-Inducing Effects of Horizontal Mergers: An 
Exploratory Analysis, Journal of Industrial Economics, 46, 525-543. 
Werden, G., A. Joskow and R. Johnson (1991), The Effects of Mergers on Price and Output: 
Two Case Studies from the Airline Industry, Managerial and Decision Economics, 12, 
341-352. 
Williamson, O. (1968), Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, American 
Economic Review, 58, 18-36.   
 
 
 
APPENDIX 
Table 9: Summary statistics - operational exits 
 quarter before/of exit quarter after exit period before exit period after exit
 mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. 
         
ln(non-stop yield) 2.829 (0.662) 2.859 (0.661) 2.867 (0.665) 2.872 (0.665) 
non-stop yield 21.471 (17.321) 22.089 (17.532) 22.337 (17.832) 22.508 (18.177) 
ln(departures) 6.991 (0.812) 6.882 (0.904) 6.990 (0.838) 6.922 (0.875) 
departures 1,476 (1,236) 1,392 (1,229) 1,494 (1275) 1,430 (1268) 
ln(Passengers) 11.328 (0.911) 11.203 (0.994) 11.352 (0.917) 11.256 (0.964) 
Passengers 122,031 (113,940) 112,891 (109,714) 124,630 (114,913) 117,285 (113,523) 
 # airlines w/o exit 0.064 (0.370) 0.283 (0.520) 0.018 (0.306) 0.031 (0.349) 
         
post-exit monopoly 0.425 (0.495) 0.425 (0.495) 0.425 (0.494) 0.423 (0.494) 
         
# airlines w/o exit 1.541 (0.950) 1.825 (0.910) 1.447 (0.959) 1.817 (0.882) 
# LCCs w/o exit 0.398 (0.564) 0.404 (0.571) 0.339 (0.526) 0.429 (0.596) 
avg. plane size 117.156 (42.346) 114.341 (45.406) 121.731 (41.209) 114.559 (45.722) 
ln(one-stop yield) 2.733 (1.151) 2.798 (1.019) 2.840 (1.006) 2.807 (1.032) 
missing one-stop yield 0.025 (0.156) 0.016 (0.127) 0.015 (0.122) 0.017 (0.128) 
         
airport size  1.843 (0.807) 1.827 (0.800) 1.848 (0.797) 1.831 (0.800) 
ln(# establ. ) 11.589 (0.743) 11.593 (0.744) 11.573 (0.743) 11.607 (0.745) 
ln(avg. weekly wage) 6.682 (0.170) 6.695 (0.167) 6.658 (0.175) 6.716 (0.165) 
ln(labor force) 14.492 (0.685) 14.494 (0.684) 14.482 (0.686) 14.502 (0.684) 
         
Year 2004 (3.737) 2004 (3.756) 2003 (3.766) 2005 (3.753) 
Quarter 2 0.228 (0.420) 0.219 (0.414) 0.251 (0.433) 0.252 (0.434) 
Quarter 3 0.285 (0.452) 0.228 (0.420) 0.250 (0.433) 0.246 (0.430) 
Quarter 4 0.268 (0.443) 0.285 (0.452) 0.249 (0.432) 0.249 (0.433) 
Observations 918 918 7,319 7,271 
Notes: Prices in 1995 $ cents. 
Sources: U.S. DOT, T-100 Domestic Segment Data, Airline Origin and Destination and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 10: Summary statistics - merger exits (switching routes) 
 quarter before/of exit quarter after exit period before exit period after exit
 mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. 
ln(non-stop yield) 2.594 (0.527) 2.603 (0.512) 2.607 (0.538) 2.609 (0.489) 
non-stop yield 15.477 (9.338) 15.512 (9.221) 15.820 (9.966) 15.389 (8.364) 
ln(departures) 7.010 (0.852) 7.025 (0.827) 6.994 (0.830) 7.057 (0.844) 
departures 1,525 (1,206) 1,532 (1,223) 1,486 (1,179) 1,598 (1,275) 
ln(Passengers) 11.687 (0.827) 11.660 (0.826) 11.673 (0.815) 11.709 (0.838) 
Passengers 161,172 (122,384) 157,622 (122,376) 158,124 (120,170) 167,396 (132,690) 
 # airlines w/o exit -0.005 (0.204) 0.005 (0.297) -0.008 (0.274) 0.014 (0.242) 
         
post-exit monopoly 0.276 (0.448) 0.276 (0.448) 0.276 (0.447) 0.259 (0.438) 
         
# airlines w/o exit 1.005 (0.814) 1.009 (0.844) 1.051 (0.860) 1.083 (0.865) 
# LCCs w/o exit 0.498 (0.528) 0.493 (0.554) 0.503 (0.550) 0.543 (0.582) 
avg. plane size 143.387 (23.694) 142.432 (24.771) 144.700 (25.261) 141.724 (24.495) 
ln(one-stop yield) 2.645 (0.625) 2.658 (0.616) 2.635 (0.705) 2.679 (0.603) 
missing one-stop yield 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.003 (0.059) 0.000 (0.000) 
         
airport size 2.107 (0.759) 2.140 (0.770) 2.125 (0.740) 2.141 (0.799) 
ln(# establ. ) 11.389 (0.583) 11.391 (0.579) 11.369 (0.583) 11.405 (0.576) 
ln(avg. weekly wage) 6.690 (0.175) 6.682 (0.166) 6.647 (0.172) 6.703 (0.157) 
ln(labor force) 14.310 (0.515) 14.312 (0.515) 14.297 (0.517) 14.320 (0.513) 
         
Year 2004 (3.915) 2004 (4.096) 2003 (4.079) 2005 (3.931) 
Quarter 2 0.207 (0.406) 0.069 (0.254) 0.250 (0.433) 0.267 (0.443) 
Quarter 3 0.373 (0.485) 0.207 (0.406) 0.249 (0.433) 0.231 (0.422) 
Quarter 4 0.350 (0.478) 0.373 (0.485) 0.250 (0.433) 0.233 (0.423) 
Observations 217 217 1,734 1,620 
Notes: Prices in 1995 $ cents. 
Sources: U.S. DOT, T-100 Domestic Segment Data, Airline Origin and Destination and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
Table 11: Summary statistics - merger exits (overlapping routes) 
 quarter before/of exit quarter after exit period before exit period after exit
 mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. 
ln(non-stop yield) 3.060 (0.687) 3.121 (0.713) 3.132 (0.689) 3.079 (0.700) 
non-stop yield 26.741 (18.466) 28.805 (20.195) 28.813 (19.850) 27.600 (19.625) 
ln(departures) 7.059 (0.671) 7.032 (0.661) 7.061 (0.654) 7.070 (0.658) 
departures 1,492 (1,338) 1,449 (1,328) 1,480 (1299) 1,506 (1420) 
ln(Passengers) 11.414 (0.795) 11.309 (0.838) 11.471 (0.771) 11.441 (0.813) 
Passengers 129,407 (139,133) 121,612 (142,607) 135,024 (141,801) 134,591 (149,189) 
 # airlines w/o exit -0.025 (0.158) 0.038 (0.250) 0.005 (0.222) 0.016 (0.226) 
         
post-exit monopoly 0.468 (0.502) 0.468 (0.502) 0.468 (0.499) 0.448 (0.498) 
         
# airlines w/o exit 0.772 (1.208) 0.810 (1.220) 0.739 (1.180) 0.890 (1.281) 
# LCCs w/o exit 0.241 (0.459) 0.278 (0.505) 0.201 (0.413) 0.310 (0.515) 
avg. plane size 108.889 (38.023) 105.433 (39.557) 114.517 (37.854) 111.790 (41.470) 
ln(one-stop yield) 2.760 (1.311) 2.973 (0.964) 2.925 (1.079) 2.921 (1.124) 
missing one-stop yield 0.038 (0.192) 0.013 (0.113) 0.021 (0.142) 0.022 (0.146) 
         
airport size 1.745 (0.697) 1.759 (0.688) 1.789 (0.694) 1.781 (0.689) 
ln(# establ. ) 11.502 (0.672) 11.492 (0.679) 11.503 (0.661) 11.535 (0.690) 
ln(avg. weekly wage) 6.841 (0.132) 6.800 (0.132) 6.791 (0.128) 6.819 (0.124) 
ln(labor force) 14.460 (0.600) 14.456 (0.602) 14.458 (0.594) 14.488 (0.609) 
         
Year 2008 (2.885) 2008 (3.226) 2007 (3.099) 2009 (3.299) 
Quarter 2 0.101 (0.304) 0.025 (0.158) 0.250 (0.433) 0.310 (0.463) 
Quarter 3 0.139 (0.348) 0.101 (0.304) 0.250 (0.433) 0.183 (0.387) 
Quarter 4 0.734 (0.445) 0.139 (0.348) 0.250 (0.433) 0.196 (0.398) 
Observations 79 79 632 509 
Notes: Prices in 1995 $ cents. 
Sources: U.S. DOT, T-100 Domestic Segment Data, Airline Origin and Destination and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 12: Summary statistics – liquidation exits 
 before/of exit after exit period before exit period after exit
 mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. 
ln(non-stop yield) 2.373 (0.525) 2.487 (0.534) 2.420 (0.534) 2.483 (0.547) 
non-stop yield 12.337 (6.898) 13.997 (8.709) 13.250 (9.549) 14.157 (9.439) 
ln(departures) 7.263 (0.733) 7.059 (0.841) 7.263 (0.790) 7.133 (0.798) 
Departures 1,819 (1,323) 1,560 (1,182) 1,900 (1523) 1,639 (1145) 
ln(Passengers) 11.896 (0.743) 11.699 (0.853) 11.903 (0.773) 11.798 (0.810) 
Passengers 189,951 (144,791) 167,394 (143,222) 195,816 (157,550) 177,768 (132,856) 
 # airlines w/o exit 0.023 (0.151) 0.205 (0.408) 0.006 (0.262) 0.031 (0.365) 
         
post-exit monopoly 0.318 (0.471) 0.318 (0.471) 0.318 (0.466) 0.318 (0.466) 
         
# airlines w/o exit 2.023 (1.285) 2.227 (1.309) 2.034 (1.331) 2.230 (1.155) 
# LCCs w/o exit 0.295 (0.462) 0.409 (0.497) 0.276 (0.447) 0.517 (0.594) 
avg. plane size 146.421 (42.781) 147.572 (46.584) 147.936 (43.786) 149.001 (44.010) 
ln(one-stop yield) 2.492 (0.678) 2.583 (0.668) 2.532 (0.659) 2.536 (0.660) 
missing one-stop yield 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
         
airport size 2.057 (0.735) 1.945 (0.715) 2.051 (0.722) 1.996 (0.725) 
ln(# establ. ) 11.809 (0.619) 11.815 (0.618) 11.788 (0.620) 11.832 (0.614) 
ln(avg. weekly wage) 6.746 (0.180) 6.764 (0.147) 6.710 (0.147) 6.771 (0.152) 
ln(labor force) 14.684 (0.578) 14.689 (0.577) 14.672 (0.571) 14.695 (0.569) 
         
Year 2004 (2.548) 2004 (2.726) 2003 (2.566) 2005 (2.566) 
Quarter 2 0.000 (0.000) 0.273 (0.451) 0.250 (0.434) 0.250 (0.434) 
Quarter 3 0.432 (0.501) 0.000 (0.000) 0.250 (0.434) 0.250 (0.434) 
Quarter 4 0.295 (0.462) 0.432 (0.501) 0.250 (0.434) 0.250 (0.434) 
Observations 44 44 352 352 
Notes: Prices in 1995 $ cents. 
Sources: U.S. DOT, T-100 Domestic Segment Data, Airline Origin and Destination and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Table 13: Fixed effects regressions for the effect of exits on non-stop yield (excluding large mergers) 
 ln(non-stop yield) – short term ln(non-stop yield) – medium term ln(non-stop yield) – long term
Variable coef.  (s.e.) coef.  (s.e.) coef.  (s.e.) coef.  (s.e.) coef.  (s.e.) coef.  (s.e.) 
operational exit 0.065 *** (0.006) 0.057*** (0.007) 0.071*** (0.006) 0.060*** (0.007) 0.060*** (0.006) 0.050*** (0.007) 
merger exit (switching) 0.003  (0.022) 0.000 (0.023) 0.003 (0.022) -0.003 (0.023) 0.011 (0.025) 0.006 (0.027) 
merger exit (overlap) -0.086  (0.054) -0.087 (0.054) -0.066 (0.054) -0.067 (0.054) -0.066 (0.056) -0.067 (0.056) 
liquidation exit 0.125 *** (0.017) 0.111*** (0.020) 0.129*** (0.017) 0.117*** (0.018) 0.113*** (0.017) 0.105*** (0.019) 
              
Op. exit # monopoly    0.018* (0.010)   0.025** (0.010)   0.023** (0.010) 
m. ex. (sw.) # monopoly    0.033 (0.055)   0.075 (0.062)   0.061 (0.052) 
m. ex. (ov.) # monopoly    -     -     -   
liquid. exit # monopoly    0.042 (0.035)   0.039 (0.037)   0.023 (0.036) 
              
# airlines w/o exit -0.019 *** (0.006) -0.018*** (0.006) -0.022*** (0.006) -0.019*** (0.006) -0.035*** (0.005) -0.034*** (0.005) 
# LCCs w/o exit -0.103 *** (0.016) -0.102*** (0.016) -0.104*** (0.014) -0.103*** (0.014) -0.094*** (0.013) -0.093*** (0.013) 
Avg. plane size -0.001 *** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.000** (0.000) -0.000** (0.000) -0.000* (0.000) -0.000* (0.000) 
ln(one-stop yield) 0.355 *** (0.029) 0.354*** (0.029) 0.383*** (0.027) 0.382*** (0.027) 0.368*** (0.033) 0.369*** (0.033) 
missing one-stop yield 2.439 *** (0.204) 2.434*** (0.205) 2.642*** (0.194) 2.639*** (0.194) 2.533*** (0.236) 2.532*** (0.237) 
              
airport size (mean) -0.042 * (0.022) -0.042* (0.022) -0.036* (0.021) -0.036* (0.021) -0.028 (0.020) -0.028 (0.020) 
ln(# establ. ) (mean) 0.452 *** (0.119) 0.461*** (0.119) 0.337*** (0.109) 0.359*** (0.110) 0.118 (0.096) 0.139 (0.097) 
ln(avg. weekly wage) 0.171 *** (0.066) 0.172*** (0.066) 0.178*** (0.057) 0.180*** (0.057) 0.190*** (0.058) 0.190*** (0.058) 
ln(labor force) 0.615 ** (0.250) 0.621** (0.250) 0.605** (0.241) 0.600** (0.241) 0.676*** (0.208) 0.664*** (0.208) 
              
Year -0.057 *** (0.006) -0.058*** (0.006) -0.048*** (0.005) -0.049*** (0.005) -0.027*** (0.004) -0.028*** (0.004) 
Quarter 2 -0.016 *** (0.004) -0.016*** (0.004) -0.015*** (0.004) -0.015*** (0.004) -0.007** (0.003) -0.007** (0.003) 
Quarter 3 -0.043 *** (0.006) -0.043*** (0.006) -0.038*** (0.005) -0.038*** (0.005) -0.025*** (0.004) -0.025*** (0.004) 
Quarter 4 -0.068 *** (0.007) -0.068*** (0.007) -0.060*** (0.006) -0.061*** (0.006) -0.045*** (0.005) -0.045*** (0.005) 
Constant 101.280 *** (10.025) 101.959*** (10.046) 84.567*** (8.546) 85.556*** (8.562) 44.498*** (6.281) 45.015*** (6.280) 
     
R2 0.264/0.108/0.109 0.265/0.105/0.105 0.274/0.150/0.150 0.276/0.144/0.144 0.254/0.186/0.185 0.256/0.181/0.180 
Observations 8,875 8,875 10,655 10,655 14,152 14,152 
Routes 890 890 890 890 890 890 
Notes: Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Sources: U.S. DOT, T-100 Domestic Segment Data, Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, authors’ calculations. 
Table 14: Fixed effects regressions for the effect of exits on number of departures (excluding large mergers) 
 ln(departures) – short term ln(departures) – medium term ln(departures) – long term
Variables coef.  (s.e.) coef.  (s.e.) coef.  (s.e.) coef.  (s.e.) coef.  (s.e.) coef.  (s.e.) 
              
operational exit -0.216 *** (0.013) -0.133*** (0.013) -0.209*** (0.013) -0.131*** (0.013) -0.210*** (0.013) -0.142*** (0.013) 
merger exit (switching) -0.089 *** (0.032) -0.072** (0.031) -0.060* (0.031) -0.062* (0.032) -0.077** (0.037) -0.093** (0.038) 
merger exit (overlap) -0.044  (0.045) -0.036 (0.045) -0.036 (0.055) -0.029 (0.056) -0.044 (0.065) -0.039 (0.065) 
liquidation exit -0.173 *** (0.033) -0.143*** (0.036) -0.175*** (0.029) -0.148*** (0.035) -0.186*** (0.031) -0.169*** (0.039) 
              
op. exit # monopoly    -0.186*** (0.027)   -0.175*** (0.024)   -0.157*** (0.022) 
m. exit (sw.)#monopoly    -0.193 (0.130)   0.039 (0.072)   0.212** (0.095) 
m. exit (ov.) # monopoly              
liq. exit # monopoly    -0.082 (0.070)   -0.076 (0.055)   -0.037 (0.053) 
              
# airlines w/o exit  0.158 *** (0.015) 0.140*** (0.015) 0.155*** (0.015) 0.139*** (0.015) 0.146*** (0.015) 0.137*** (0.015) 
# LCCs w/o exit 0.058 ** (0.029) 0.052* (0.029) 0.084*** (0.026) 0.075*** (0.026) 0.094*** (0.023) 0.085*** (0.023) 
Avg. plane size -0.004 *** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.005*** (0.001) -0.005*** (0.001) 
              
airport size (mean) 0.769 *** (0.051) 0.773*** (0.049) 0.781*** (0.053) 0.787*** (0.050) 0.791*** (0.052) 0.795*** (0.049) 
ln(# establ. ) (mean) 0.433 ** (0.218) 0.308 (0.212) 0.675*** (0.209) 0.511** (0.201) 0.690*** (0.188) 0.558*** (0.184) 
ln(avg. weekly wage) (mean) 0.718 *** (0.128) 0.720*** (0.125) 0.747*** (0.120) 0.756*** (0.119) 0.714*** (0.109) 0.737*** (0.108) 
ln(labor force) (mean) 0.906 * (0.474) 0.891* (0.468) 0.523 (0.454) 0.561 (0.453) 0.159 (0.399) 0.211 (0.397) 
              
Year -0.021 ** (0.010) -0.018* (0.010) -0.020** (0.009) -0.016* (0.009) -0.012* (0.007) -0.011 (0.007) 
Quarter 2 0.068 *** (0.009) 0.069*** (0.009) 0.065*** (0.009) 0.066*** (0.008) 0.065*** (0.007) 0.067*** (0.007) 
Quarter 3 0.068 *** (0.011) 0.070*** (0.011) 0.065*** (0.010) 0.067*** (0.010) 0.062*** (0.009) 0.064*** (0.009) 
Quarter 4 -0.014  (0.010) -0.011 (0.010) -0.021** (0.009) -0.018* (0.009) -0.019** (0.008) -0.017** (0.008) 
Constant 25.667  (16.458) 19.999 (16.467) 24.827 (15.124) 19.125 (15.019) 15.670 (12.391) 13.304 (12.270) 
                   
R2 (within/between/overall) 0.220/0.203/0.194 0.237/0.215/0.207 0.239/0.221/0.211 0.259/0.236/0.227 0.257/0.264/0.254 0.275/0.283/0.272 
Observations 8,875 8,875 10,655 10,655 14,152 14,152 
Routes 890 890 890 890 890 890 
Notes: Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Sources: U.S. DOT, T-100 Domestic Segment Data and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, authors’ calculations. 
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Table 15: Fixed effects regressions for the effect of exits on number of passengers (excluding large mergers) 
 ln(passengers) – short term ln(passengers) – medium term ln(passengers) – long term
Variables coef.  (s.e.) coef.  (s.e.) coef.  (s.e.) coef.  (s.e.) coef.  (s.e.) coef.  (s.e.) 
              
operational exit -0.186 *** (0.012) -0.104*** (0.013) -0.181*** (0.013) -0.102*** (0.013) -0.187*** (0.013) -0.117*** (0.013) 
merger exit (switching) -0.091 *** (0.029) -0.073*** (0.028) -0.060** (0.028) -0.064** (0.029) -0.075** (0.034) -0.100*** (0.033) 
merger exit (overlap) -0.053  (0.041) -0.044 (0.041) -0.013 (0.053) -0.006 (0.053) -0.035 (0.060) -0.030 (0.060) 
liquidation exit -0.150 *** (0.040) -0.075** (0.037) -0.161*** (0.039) -0.091** (0.037) -0.182*** (0.036) -0.131*** (0.040) 
              
op. exit # monopoly    -0.183*** (0.027)   -0.177*** (0.025)   -0.160*** (0.022) 
m. ex. (sw.) # monopoly    -0.202* (0.111)   0.067 (0.093)   0.338*** (0.091) 
m. ex. (ov.) # monopoly              
liq. exit # monopoly    -0.223** (0.089)   -0.208** (0.083)   -0.147** (0.067) 
              
# airlines w/o exit  0.139 *** (0.014) 0.122*** (0.014) 0.136*** (0.014) 0.121*** (0.014) 0.130*** (0.014) 0.122*** (0.013) 
# LCCs w/o exit 0.084 *** (0.030) 0.076** (0.030) 0.111*** (0.027) 0.100*** (0.026) 0.119*** (0.023) 0.108*** (0.023) 
avg. plane size 0.005 *** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 
              
airport size (mean) 1.014 *** (0.054) 1.018*** (0.052) 1.003*** (0.057) 1.008*** (0.054) 0.981*** (0.054) 0.985*** (0.051) 
ln(# establ. ) (mean) 0.272  (0.214) 0.169 (0.205) 0.544*** (0.206) 0.398** (0.195) 0.605*** (0.187) 0.484*** (0.180) 
ln(avg. weekly wage) (mean) 0.560 *** (0.131) 0.557*** (0.129) 0.649*** (0.123) 0.652*** (0.123) 0.695*** (0.111) 0.714*** (0.112) 
ln(labor force) (mean) 1.080 ** (0.474) 1.047** (0.465) 0.595 (0.451) 0.617 (0.444) 0.180 (0.393) 0.219 (0.384) 
              
Year -0.007  (0.010) -0.003 (0.010) -0.007 (0.009) -0.003 (0.009) -0.000 (0.007) 0.002 (0.007) 
Quarter 2 0.152 *** (0.009) 0.153*** (0.009) 0.149*** (0.009) 0.150*** (0.009) 0.153*** (0.007) 0.155*** (0.007) 
Quarter 3 0.137 *** (0.012) 0.139*** (0.012) 0.136*** (0.010) 0.138*** (0.010) 0.138*** (0.009) 0.140*** (0.009) 
Quarter 4 0.026 ** (0.011) 0.029*** (0.011) 0.016 (0.010) 0.020** (0.010) 0.017* (0.009) 0.019** (0.009) 
Constant 0.129  (16.776) -5.666 (16.807) 3.813 (15.627) -2.274 (15.571) -5.273 (12.860) -7.886 (12.813) 
                   
R2 (within/between/overall) 0.271/0.270/0.260 0.287/0.283/0.273 0.272/0.300/0.288 0.292/0.315/0.303 0.272/0.348/0.333 0.290/0.363/0.349 
Observations 8,875 8,875 10,655 10,655 14,152 14,152 
Routes 890 890 890 890 890 890 
Notes: Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Sources: U.S. DOT, T-100 Domestic Segment Data and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, authors’ calculations. 
 
 41
Table 16: Fixed effects regressions for the effects of exits on entry (excluding large 
mergers) 
  airlines w/o 
exiting/merger -  
short term 
 airlines w/o 
exiting/merger –  
medium term 
 airlines w/o 
exiting/merger -  
long term 
 coef.  (s.e.) coef.  (s.e.) coef.  (s.e.) 
         
operational exit 0.204 *** (0.015) 0.167*** (0.014) 0.170 *** (0.013) 
merger exit (switching) 0.058  (0.039) 0.063** (0.029) 0.110 *** (0.027) 
merger exit (overlap) 0.182 ** (0.088) 0.150** (0.065) 0.184 *** (0.048) 
liquidation exit 0.125 *** (0.043) 0.111** (0.044) 0.157 *** (0.040) 
         
# airlines w/o exit (lag) -0.390 *** (0.019) -0.350*** (0.016) -0.303 *** (0.013) 
# LCCs w/o exit (lag) 0.027  (0.031) 0.029 (0.026) 0.018  (0.020) 
avg. plane size -0.004 *** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.000) -0.004 *** (0.000) 
         
airport size (mean) 0.289 *** (0.046) 0.264*** (0.041) 0.258 *** (0.033) 
ln(# establ. ) (mean) -0.371  (0.312) -0.281 (0.250) -0.243  (0.161) 
ln(avg. weekly wage) (mean) 0.013  (0.155) -0.125 (0.121) -0.066  (0.095) 
ln(labor force) (mean) -2.197 *** (0.521) -1.768*** (0.424) -1.244 *** (0.295) 
         
Year 0.044 *** (0.011) 0.020** (0.009) -0.011 * (0.006) 
Quarter 2 0.011  (0.012) 0.001 (0.010) 0.006  (0.008) 
Quarter 3 -0.015  (0.012) -0.032*** (0.010) -0.031 *** (0.008) 
Quarter 4 0.038 *** (0.014) 0.027** (0.012) 0.008  (0.010) 
Constant -51.711 *** (18.160) -8.963 (15.949) 44.411 *** (10.974) 
          
R2 (within/between/overall) 0.215 / 0.002 / 0.002 0.192 / 0.002 / 0.003 0.172 / 0.002 / 0.004 
Observations 8,838 10,618 14,115 
Routes 890 890 890 
Notes: Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Sources: U.S. DOT, T-100 Domestic Segment Data and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, authors’ calculations. 
 
